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(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a 
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by 
public record during cross-examination but only if the crime was (1) 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the 
law which he was convicted, and the court determines that the 
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• • • 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution: 
Article I, §12 of the Utah Constitution provides in 
pertinent part: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right 
to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
DANNY LEE JOHNSON, : Case No. 870096 
Appellant, : Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Third 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Raymond S. 
Uno presiding. A jury found Appellant, Danny Lee Johnson, guilty 
following a trial held on January 28, 29, and 30 and February 2, 3, 
4, and 5, 1987 of Attempted Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First 
Degree, with the enhancement of Using a Firearm While Committing a 
Crime. Additionally, at a hearing before the Court held on February 
9 and 10, 1987, Mr. Johnson was found guilty of Being An Habitual 
Criminal, a felony of the First Degree. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the early morning hours of May 27, 1986, Trooper 
Dennis Bringhurst of the Utah Highway Patrol observed a vehicle 
proceed past the 13th South exit from the Interstate 15 freeway, 
then make a sharp left hand turn through the "gore" area and onto 
the 13th South off ramp. The vehicle was far enough into the gore 
area that it kicked up debris (Transcript of trial, January 28 -
February 10, 1987, hereinafter "T",1 p. 60). The trooper followed 
the vehicle, which stopped at the red light at the end of the 
northbound off ramp (T. 63). 
The driver of the vehicle, later identified as Danny Lee 
Johnson, first became aware of the trooper while stopped at the end 
of the off ramp. Mr. Johnson looked over, made eye contact with the 
officer, and smiled (T. 571-2). Mr. Johnson continued watching the 
officer for a short while because he thought the officer might want 
to pull him over because he was drunk (T. 572-3). 
According to the trooper, the vehicle remained stationary 
while the light turned green and went through a complete cycle to 
red again (T. 64). When the light turned green again, Mr. Johnson 
turned right and the trooper followed him (T. 66). Trooper 
Bringhurst made eye contact with Mr. Johnson, and asked whether he 
had been drinking (T. 66). Although Mr. Johnson responded 
affirmatively, the trooper was unable to hear him (T. 66, 573). 
Trooper Bringhurst told Mr. Johnson to complete his left turn, then 
pull over (T. 66, 573-4). 
Driving slowly, Mr. Johnson pulled onto Paxton Avenue and 
parked his vehicle under a number of overhead lights (T. 73-4, 122, 
575). Mr. Johnson chose the well lit spot because he wanted to 
leave his vehicle where it could be clearly visible since he had 
several belongings in the car and was unable to roll up the windows 
(T. 575). 
1
 The record cites to the trial held January 28 - February 10, 1987, 
are printed in reverse order. To avoid confusion, Appellant cites 
to the transcript page numbers ("T") for all transcript cites from 
the trial itself. Appellant cites to the record ("R") for all other 
cites. 
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The trooper parked his vehicle approximately one car 
length behind Mr. Johnson's car with the passenger side of the 
vehicle directly behind the driver's side of Mr. Johnson's vehicle 
(T. 72). The trooper exited his vehicle and approached Mr. 
Johnson's car in a cocky happy-go-lucky manner because he believed 
he was about to make an arrest for driving under the influence 
(T. 81-2/ 512). The trooper was unsure of whether he held his 
flashlight in his left hand/ as required by police procedures/ or 
his right hand (T. 81-2/ 82). 
The trooper approached the vehicle and asked "Did you say 
you have been drinking?" (T. 83). Mr. Johnson testified that as 
Trooper Bringhurst approached Mr. Johnson's vehicle/ Mr. Johnson 
smiled in an attempt to be congenial/ then informed the trooper that 
he had a gun in the car which he was going to hand out the window 
(T. 577-8). When talking to Lt. Fallows shortly after the incident/ 
Trooper Bringhurst had difficulty remembering what Mr. Johnson said 
to him as he approached the vehicle (T. 535)f however at trial the 
trooper testified that Mr. Johnson said "it doesn't make any 
difference, does it?" (T. 83/ 84/ 88). 
Trooper Bringhurst then saw the top of a gun (T. 83-4). 
The gun did not protrude out the window (T. 142-3). 
The trooper reacted when he saw the gun by jumping back/ 
screwing up his facef taking a couple steps backward/ then going 
into a crouch (T. 579). He threw something downr which may have 
been his flashlight (T. 579). The trooper testified that he threw 
his body backward and landed on his back when he saw the gunf and 
- 3 -
was reaching for his own sidearm as he went down (T. 84). However, 
Officer Evans witnessed the trooper still standing after three shots 
had been fired (T. 224-5). 
Six shots were fired altogether. Mr. Johnson testified 
that he opened the door of his car and attempted to get out of the 
vehicle after informing the trooper that he was handing out a weapon 
(T. 581). Mr. Johnson slipped as he was getting out of the car and, 
as he was turning in an attempt to recover his position, Mr. Johnson 
saw a movement out of the corner of his eye, then a flash like a 
flame shot out from Bringhurst's hip (T. 581). Immediately 
thereafter, Mr. Johnson felt something hit his right cheek (T. 
581). The force of the impact spun Mr. Johnson around. A second or 
two later, Mr. Johnson saw another flash from the trooper's gun (T. 
582). Mr. Johnson thereafter fired a shot at the trooper; he did 
not recall picking up the shotgun or firing (T. 584). 
Trooper Bringhurst testified that he heard a "Boom" and 
saw bright light with no images and that the "Boom" was followed by 
"Pop pop pop pop pop" (T. 85-86). Officer Evans however, heard 
three shots as he approached, then witnessed Trooper Bringhurst fire 
three more rounds into the car (T. 224). The trooper was standing 
after the first three shots had been fired, then, as he was firing 
the shots, went down into a seated position on the roadway (T. 
224-5) . 
The trooper did not recall the door to Mr. Johnson's 
vehicle being open (T. 145), yet four rounds were found in the 
interior of Mr. Johnson's vehicle. Three of those four shots were 
in a position which would require an open door (T. 369-70). 
Furthermore, Mr. Johnson sustained three gunshot wounds to the left 
flank (T. 567). 
Over defense objection, (R. Ill, 118, 968-9, 973) the 
state presented evidence that Mr. Johnson had been angry earlier in 
the evening and had telephoned Jean Hickham and allegedly made 
threatening statements (T. 714-17). The state also presented 
evidence, again over defense objection, (T. 761-3) as to Trooper 
Bringhurstfs character for truthfulness (T. 765, 768). 
After the jury convicted Mr. Johnson of Attempted 
Homicide, a first degree felony, the state presented evidence of the 
Habitual Criminal Charge to the trial Judge (T. 874-84). That 
evidence consisted of a conviction for vehicle burglary in Idaho and 
two convictions for escape, in addition to the triggering offense of 
Attempted Homicide. The trial judge convicted Mr. Johnson of Being 
an Habitual Criminal (T. 903). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There was insufficient evidence to establish that Mr. 
Johnson intended to cause the death of Trooper Bringhurst. In the 
alternative, if the court finds sufficient evidence of intent, such 
evidence can only support a conviction for manslaughter. 
The trial court erred in denying Mr. Johnson's motion to 
suppress his misdemeanor theft convictions. The convictions were 
not for crimes of dishonesty or false statement within the meaning 
of Rule 609(a)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) and their erroneous 
admission prejudiced Mr. Johnson. 
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The trial court erred in admitting the bloody clothing of 
Trooper Bringhurst because its prejudicial effect outweighed its 
probative value. The evidence was cumulative and inflamed the jury. 
The testimony of Jean Hickham regarding a telephone 
conversation several hours prior to the incident was not relevant 
since it did not offer any probative information regarding an intent 
by Mr. Johnson to kill Trooper Bringhurst. The testimony was more 
prejudicial than probative since it painted a picture of Mr. Johnson 
as a violent character; the testimony also substantially confused 
the issues. 
The trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial 
after Officer Olsen testified in response to the prosecutor's direct 
question that he was guarding Mr. Johnson to prevent escape 
attempts. Such testimony suggested that Mr. Johnson was a dangerous 
and violent man, thereby prejudicing him. 
The trial court erred in not declaring Lt. Dan Fallows of 
the Utah Highway Patrol a hostile witness or witness associated with 
an adverse party under Rule 611(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1983). A witness need not show actual hostility in order to be 
considered adverse under the rule; the fact that Lt. Fallows was 
employed by the state, a close associate of Trooper Bringhurst, 
reluctant to testify for the defense, and unwilling to meet with 
defense counsel without the presence of the prosecutor show that he 
was aligned with the state and adverse to the defense. 
The trial court committed reversible error in allowing 
two officers to testify in rebuttal that Trooper Bringhurst had a 
reputation for honesty. The defense had not attacked the trooper's 
credibility and therefore, pursuant to Rule 608(a), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1983), the evidence was not admissible. While defense 
counsel did cross-examine the trooper regarding prior inconsistent 
statements, such examination was not an attack on his credibility 
and served only to establish the Trooper's difficulty in remembering 
details* 
The trial court erred in permitting the jurors to 
deliberate in open court early in the trial. Such early 
deliberation violated the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury 
and the fourteenth amendment right to due process and a fair trial 
under the federal constitution. The jury was tainted by the early 
deliberations thereby denying Mr. Johnson a fair trial. 
The early deliberations also violated due process and the 
right to an impartial jury under the Utah Constitution. In the 
event this court finds that the federal constitution was not 
violated, it nevertheless is free to extend the Utah Constitution to 
cover this situation. 
The trial court erred in denying defense counsel's 
motions to withdraw and for a mistrial when it became necessary for 
her to testify in rebuttal to Detective Imig's testimony. Defense 
counsel needed to testify to establish that Imig had told her 
information inconsistent with his testimony, which, contrary to the 
testimony of Imig at trial, suggested that at the time of the 
incident Mr. vjohnson reasonably believed Imig would be interested in 
any guns he might procure. 
The cumulative effect of the errors warrants reversal 
where the errors combined to bolster Trooper Bringhurst while 
undermining Mr. Johnson. 
The Habitual Criminal Statute explicitly excludes murder 
as a triggering offense for an "Habitual Criminal11 charge. 
Attempted murder is not a separate or different offense from the 
substantive offense of murder, and therefore is excluded as a 
triggering offense by the language of the statute. 
The trial court erred in admitting Mr. Johnson's prior 
convictions in support of the Habitual Criminal charge where the 
state did not establish that the pleas were knowingly and 
voluntarily made. 
The prior convictions of Mr. Johnson would not have been 
felonies in the State of Utah and therefore cannot support an 
Habitual Criminal charge. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION 
FOR ATTEMPTED FIRST DEGREE MURDER. 
In order to convict Mr. Johnson of attempted first degree 
murder, the State must prove each element of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See Utah Code Ann. §76-1-501 (1953 as amended). 
One of the elements of first degree murder is that the defendant 
intentionally or knowingly attempted to cause the death of another. 
See State v. Dumasy 721 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1986). 
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court 
will "view the evidence. . ., including all reasonable inferences 
therefrom, in the light most favorable to. . . conviction [ ]" and 
reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence " . . . only when 
the evidence . . . is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
A. THE EVIDENCE OF INTENT TO CAUSE TROOPER 
BRINGHURSTfS DEATH IS INSUFFICIENT. 
"'The law does not presume because an assault was made 
with a weapon likely to produce death, that it was an assault with 
the intent to murder.'" State v. Castonguay, 663 P.2d at 1323, 1326 
(Utah 1983) (quoting Thacker v. Commonweath, 134 Va. 767, 114 S.E. 
504, 505 (1922)). Therefore, evidence of intent other than the use 
of a weapon is required to sustain the conviction for attempted 
homicide. 
1. Evidence of Intent is Inherently Improbable. 
In determining whether the state introduced sufficient 
evidence to establish that Danny Lee Johnson intended to kill 
Trooper Bringhurst, the ten or so seconds from the point at which 
Trooper Bringhurst first saw the muzzle of the gun move across 
Mr. Johnson's lap while he was seated inside the car to the moment 
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the last shot was fired (T. 265, 298) are critical. Trooper 
Bringhurst and Danny Lee Johnson are the only two individuals who 
observed the entire incident. In addition, the testimony of Officer 
Evans who observed a portion of the incident and the physical 
evidence offer an indication of what actually occurred during those 
crucial seconds. 
Danny Lee Johnson testified that when the Officer 
approached his vehicle, Mr. Johnson smiled in an attempt to be 
congenial, then informed the trooper that he was handing a weapon 
out the window (T. 577). Mr. Johnson testified that he then reached 
with his left hand for the shotgun which was on the seat next to 
him, and lifted the gun across his lap (T. 578). He did not have a 
rear view mirror on the driver's door, so he turned to see the 
trooper (T. 579). The trooper saw the gun, jumped back, threw aside 
his flashlight and reached for his gun (T. 579-80). Danny let go of 
the shotgun and asked the trooper what was the matter (T. 580). The 
trooper did not respond, and Danny moved to get out of the car 
(T. 580-1). As he got out of the car, he slipped, then turned to 
face the trooper just as he saw a flame fly out from the trooper's 
hip (T. 581). This first shot hit Danny in the cheek and spun him 
around (T. 581). A couple of seconds later he saw the trooper fire 
again then felt a second shot hit his flank (T. 582). 
Mr. Johnson based his defense on this testimony that the 
trooper fired first and that Mr. Johnson responded to save his 
life. If Trooper Bringhurst, not Mr. Johnson, fired the first shot, 
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then it cannot be established that Mr. Johnson intended to kill the 
Trooper. 
In order to find the necessary intent, the jury must have 
disbelieved the testimony of Mr. Johnson, and believed the testimony 
of Trooper Bringhurst. However, the testimony of Trooper Bringhurst 
is inherently improbable when viewed in conjunction with the 
testimony of Officer Evans and the physical evidence. 
Trooper Bringhurst testified that he approached Mr. 
Johnson's car that night "in a carefree happy go lucky mannerff 
(T. 82). He told Lieutenant Fallows that he felt "cocky, I was sure 
I had a drunk" (T. 512). 
In such an uncautious state of mind, the trooper 
approached Mr. Johnsonfs car. The trooper testified that at that 
point he asked Mr. Johnson, "Did you say you have been drinking?", 
and that Mr. Johnson replied, "It doesn't make any difference, does 
it?" (T. 83). Yet, the trooper told Lieutenant Fallows shortly 
after the incident, "Hell, I wish I could remember what he said." 
(T. 535). Mr. Johnson testified that he responded to the trooper's 
question by telling him that he was going to hand the weapon out the 
window (T. 577). 
Trooper Bringhurst testified that he saw Mr. Johnson pick 
up a gun (T. 83), then saw the "muzzle and part of the barrel as it 
came up over his lap" (T. 84). The trooper never saw the barrel 
outside the window of Mr. Johnson's car nor the gun actually 
pointing at him (T. 142-3). According to Trooper Bringhurst, the 
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moment he saw the gun, he threw himself backward toward the ground 
(T. 84). 
The trooper testified further that he heard a loud 
explosion or boom as he was going down (T. 84-85), As he went down, 
he was reaching for his sidearm, and never had the weapon out before 
hitting the ground (T. 147, 84-85). The trooper heard the boom, 
followed by five pops (T. 86). The implication of the Trooper's 
testimony is that Danny Lee Johnson fired the first shot or boom as 
the trooper went down to the ground and that while on the ground, 
the trooper fired his five shots in rapid succession. 
Such testimony is inherently improbable because it 
directly contradicts the testimony of another police officer who 
witnessed a portion of the events. Officer Evans heard three shots 
as he approached Paxton Ave. (T. 222, 251-2). When he arrived, 
Trooper Bringhurst was still standing (T. 254-5). The trooper fired 
three more shots into the car; as he was firing those three shots, 
Officer Evans observed the trooper moving backwards and going to the 
ground (T. 225, 254-5). Officer Evans1 testimony establishes that 
Trooper Bringhurst had his gun out and was firing while still 
standing, contrary to the trooper's testimony that his gun did not 
come out until after Mr. Johnson fired. 
Trooper Bringhurst's ability to perceive and recall the 
details of the incident was impacted by his reaction to the 
incident; the extent of that impact is evidenced by the fact that he 
"blacked out" from the time the first shot was fired or could not 
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remember what happened until the time he fired his last shot 
(T. 86-7). Officer Evans, however, was not a participant in the 
incident and his ability to perceive and recall the details was not 
affected by his involvement and emotional reaction. His perceptions 
as a trained police officer observing the scene cannot be totally 
disregarded yet, in order to have found intent, the jury must have 
done so. 
Trooper Bringhurst's version is also inherently 
improbable because the physical evidence contradicts it. Four 
bullets went into the interior of Mr. Johnson's car (T. 369-70, 
330-3). Three of the four bullets could not have been fired with 
the door closed (T. 364). Nevertheless, the trooper recalled that 
the door was closed throughout the incident (T. 145). In addition, 
if the trooper were down as he had testified, bullets or bullet 
holes would have been found in the drivers door. Furthermore, Mr. 
Johnson's wounds in his left flank over his pelvic bone from back to 
front (T. 567-8) required that the trooper shoot directly into Mr. 
Johnson's back with the door open. Finally the trajectory of the 
bullets required that the door be opened, since none of the bullets 
appeared to have been fired at an up or down angle (T. 329, 330-33). 
At the time of his last shot, the trooper remembers 
seeing Mr. Johnson "seated behind the wheel. His head and his neck 
is all that showed up above the door. I raised my pistol, . . . and 
fired a shot. As I fired the shot, Danny Lee disappeared into the 
interior of the vehicle." (T. 87). Trooper Bringhurst did not 
recall the driver's car door being open at any time during the 
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incident. (T. 145). This directly contradicts Officer Evans' 
observations since he did not see Mr. Johnson at all (T. 227), which 
suggests that Mr. Johnson was down by the time the fourth shot was 
fired.2 
In order for the jury to find specific intent based on 
Trooper Bringhurst's testimony, the jury must have completely 
disregarded Officer Evans1 testimony. The trooper could not have 
immediately thrown himself back on the ground, and still been 
standing three shots later when Officer Evans saw him. Nor did his 
gun come out only after he had hit the ground, as Trooper Bringhurst 
testified. 
This incident occurred during a very brief period of 
time. The trooper acknowledged that he "blacked out" or could not 
remember what had transpired from the first shot to the last 
(T. 86-7). This comports with Mr. Johnson's testimony that the 
trooper seemed to panic when he saw the gun and did not thereafter 
respond to Mr. Johnson's statements. 
The only way the jury could have returned a guilty 
verdict would have been to accept the trooper's testimony up to the 
2
 Contrary to the testimony of her own witnesses, the prosecutor 
speculated in closing that Mr. Johnson opened the door after firing 
the initial shot and was then shot by the trooper (T. 816-17). The 
events occurred in a brief ten second period, not giving Mr. Johnson 
time to get out and back into the car as the prosecutor further 
speculated. Such argument is not supported by the testimony of 
Trooper Bringhurst. 
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point where he saw the gun, and reject the portion involving 
throwing himself back, firing only after he was on the ground with 
the car door closed; and then accept the physical evidence and 
Officer Evans1 testimony which establish that the events could not 
have occurred the way in which Bringhurst testified they occurred. 
To pick and discard Trooper Bringhurst's testimony in this way is to 
Tffragment the testimony in such a degree as to distort it." State 
v. Manus, 597 P.2d 280, 285 (N.M. 1979) (citations omitted). A 
finding of intent, the crucial issue of this case, cannot be based 
on a distortion. 
Also significant to the intent issue is the fact that Mr. 
Johnson chose a brightly lit spot to park his vehicle. Trooper 
Bringhurst testified that after following Mr. Johnson off of the 
interstate, he directed Mr. Johnson "to complete his left-hand turn 
and pull over to the right-hand shoulder of the road." (T. 66). 
The trooper then followed Mr. Johnson a short distance at a "slow 
pace" to Paxton Avenue where Mr. Johnson pulled over in a "well lit" 
area where there were "a lot of street lights" (T. 68, 74, 122). It 
is improbable that Mr. Johnson would have consciously selected the 
best lit location in the vicinity to pull over if he had intended to 
kill Trooper Bringhurst. Mr. Johnson's selection of a brightly lit 
spot supports his testimony that he knew he was going to be arrested 
and wanted a well lit place to leave his car so that his belongings 
would not be stolen (T. 575). 
The testimony of Jean Hickham is the only other testimony 
from which the jury arguably might have found intent. Ms. Hickham's 
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testimony was admitted over vigorous objection to its relevance, its 
evidence of character, and its prejudicial impact (T. 661-64). The 
trial court denied that motion and found the testimony admissible 
for the purpose of showing motive, opportunity and intent (T. 679, 
691). As argued infra at 35-41, such testimony was not probative of 
whether Mr. Johnson intended to shoot Trooper Bringhurst, was more 
prejudicial than probative since it painted Mr. Johnson as a violent 
character and served to confuse the issues since the jury may have 
considered the alleged threat as evidence that Mr. Johnson intended 
to shoot Bringhurst even though the threat did not deal directly 
with Trooper Bringhurst and there was no evidence that Mr. Johnson 
was carrying out the earlier threat or that Bringhurst got in the 
way of Mr. Johnson's attempts to carry out the earlier threat. 
The evidence of specific intent based on Ms. Hickhamfs 
testimony is inherently improbable. The prosecution attempted to 
elicit from Ms. Hickman supposed threatening statements made to her 
by Mr. Johnson earlier in the day in question. Ms. Hickham's 
roommate at the time was Mr. Johnson's girlfriend (T. 705). Ms. 
Hickham testified that Mr. Johnson was upset on the telephone that 
night because his girlfriend was seeing a man named Mr. Polton 
(T. 714). Ms. Hickham testified that Mr. Johnson was quite 
intoxicated at the time, but that "It's kind of hard for me to 
remember that certain night, because I had been drinking myself." 
(T. 717). In fact, Ms. Hickham had been drinking tequila for five 
hours before speaking with Mr. Johnson (T. 723-24). 
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Ms. Hickham testified to several specific threats Mr. 
Johnson made on the telephone toward Mr. Polton to be carried out at 
the apartment building (T. 714-17). She also stated that she heard 
the clicking of a gun in the background (T. 717). After ending the 
conversation with Mr. Johnson, the police were called (T. 718). The 
prosecution attempted to elicit from Ms. Hickham what she told the 
police that evening about her conversation with Mr. Johnson: 
Q. (By Ms. Knight-Eagan) Did you tell Deputy 
Wilden what Danny Johnson had said over the 
telephone?11 
A. I really don't want to answer because I don't 
know — I was in a state of mind to where I could 
have said other things that he did not say, because 
when you're upset you do say some things and you 
exaggerate a little bit more than what is going on. 
(T. 719). 
The reluctant testimony of Ms. Hickham does not establish 
that Mr. Johnson had the specific intent to cause the death of 
Trooper Bringhurst. Ms. Hickham was intoxicated and upset when she 
subsequently spoke to Officer Wilden (T. 728) and stated flatly that 
she "could have said other things that he did not say" (T. 719). 
She specifically stated that Mr. Johnson did not tell her that he 
would shoot an officer who interfered with his attempts to carry out 
the threats, and acknowledged that if that were conveyed to the 
police, she, not Danny, had suggested it (T. 721). Ms. Hickman 
testified that she probably could have told the officer things that 
Mr. Johnson did not say. (T. 730). Even if any of the statements 
were accurate, they were not threats against Trooper Bringhurst, 
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and, therefore, cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt an intent to 
harm the trooper. 
The Utah Supreme Court found the evidence of specific 
intent insufficient to support a charge of attempted first degree 
murder in State v. Castonguay, 663 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1983). The Court 
therein stated: "In virtually all cases we have examined where an 
attempt conviction was upheld, the defendant had either voiced or 
threatened his intent or else conducted himself in such unambiguous 
ways as to not reasonably allow for any other mens rea." i^ d. at 1326 
The facts in the instant case are comparable to those in 
Castonguay. The defendant in Castonguay "testified that he harbored 
no ill will against (the) officer, and had never shot a human 
being." Id. at 1326. Likewise, Mr. Johnson did not express an 
intent to kill Trooper Bringhurst at the time of the incident, or at 
any other time and testified that he was not angry at the trooper on 
that evening (T. 650). The officer in Castonguay "did not see the 
defendant's gun, let alone see the defendant point the gun at him at 
the time the alleged . . . shot was fired." 663 P.2d at 1326. The 
instant case is identical to Castonguay on this crucial point. 
Trooper Bringhurst did not see Mr. Johnson's gun, let alone see Mr. 
Johnson point the gun directly at him, at the time that the shot was 
fired. The officer in Castonguay did not see a muzzle blast. Id. 
Trooper Bringhurst did not testify that he saw a muzzle blast of 
fire. He testified only that he saw "bright light" (T. 85). He 
also testified that the area where the incident occurred 
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was ff[w]ell lit. There's alot of street lights in that area" (T. 
122) . 
The Court further noted in Castonguay that the defendant 
could easily have killed the officer if that had been his intent. 
663 P.2d at 1326. In the instant case, before he drove away Mr. 
Johnson could have picked up the loaded gun sitting on the seat next 
to him and killed Trooper Bringhurst if that had been his 
intention. The trooper had fired all of his bullets and was lying 
on the ground. If Mr. Johnson had wanted to kill him, he had the 
perfect opportunity to do so. Mr. Johnson did not take that 
opportunity because he did not have the specific intent to kill 
Trooper Bringhurst. Mr. Johnson asks this Court to find, as it did 
in Castonguay, that the evidence presented is insufficient to 
support a finding of specific intent, and therefore, insufficient to 
support the conviction of attempted first degree murder. 
2. Mr. Johnson's Level of Intoxication Negates 
the Finding of a Specific Intent to Kill 
Trooper Bringhurst. 
In addition to the fact that the evidence offered by the 
prosecution to show specific intent was inherently improbable, both 
the prosecution and defense offered evidence which negated such an 
intent. Under Utah law, "voluntary intoxication shall not be a 
defense to a criminal charge unless such intoxication negates the 
existence of the mental state which is an element of the offense." 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-306 (1953 as amended). This Court explained 
that "[e]vidence of intoxication must have relevance to the 
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defendant's mental state at the time of the crime." State v. Wood, 
648 P.2d 71, 89 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted). 
Mr. Johnson's intoxication at the time of the incident 
was so incapacitating that he could not have had the specific intent 
to cause the death of Trooper Bringhurst. Mr. Johnson testified 
that he consumed fl[q]uite an amount of whiskey, I would say a liter 
and a fifth" (T. 570) on the day in question. Indeed, Mr. Johnson's 
intoxication was so obvious that Trooper Bringhurst felt "cocky, I 
was sure I had a drunk." (T. 512). Ms. Hickham testified that Mr. 
Johnson was "quite intoxicated" earlier that evening (T. 717). The 
medical report showed that at 2:00 a.m. on May 27, 1986, after 
having been shot and losing a great deal of blood, Mr. Johnson's 
blood alcohol was .203 per cent (T. 567-8). Mr. Johnson's blood 
alcohol was almost three times higher than the legal level of 
intoxication. See Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (1983). 
The Utah Supreme Court found insufficient evidence of 
intoxication to negate the specific intent in State v. Wood. 
"Although Wood had imbibed some alcohol, there is no evidence he was 
so intoxicated at the time of the crime that he was unable to form 
the specific intent necessary . . ." 648 P.2d at 90. The instant 
case is distinguishable from Wood because there is significantly 
more evidence of Mr. Johnson's intoxication at the time of the 
incident. Unlike the instant case, the evidence of Mr. Wood's 
intoxication "was not altogether consistent." Id. at 90. Mr. Wood 
had only had two drinks on the night in question, whereas Mr. 
Johnson had consumed an entire liter and a fifth. Id. at 90. Also 
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unlike the instant case, in Wood there was no medical report nor any 
testimony showing intoxication. Id. at 90. 
The evidence of intoxication was stronger in State v. 
Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856 (Utah 1981) than it was in Wood, but not as 
strong as in the instant case. Mr. Sisneros testified to having 
drunk far less alcohol than Mr. Johnson. ]jd. at 858. Additionally, 
the police officers only thought that Mr. Sisneros "seemed to be 
under the influence of alcohol . . .[he] responded to questions and 
followed instructions." Id. The instant case is distinguishable 
from Sisneros not only because Mr. Johnson claimed to have consumed 
much more alcohol, but because that claim is corroborated by Trooper 
Bringhurst's testimony, Jean Hickham's testimony and the clear-cut 
physical evidence of the blood alcohol test. 
Mr. Johnson could not have maintained the specific intent 
to cause the death of Trooper Bringhurst in such a a dangerously 
high level of intoxication. The totality of the evidence, including 
the inherently improbable testimonies of the trooper and Ms. Hickham 
and the completely corroborated evidence of overwhelming 
intoxication, does not support the finding of specific intent. 
Reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that Mr. 
Johnson formulated the specific intent to kill Trooper Bringhurst. 
Absent a showing of such intent, the evidence is insufficient to 
support Mr. Johnson's conviction for attempted first degree murder. 
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B. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IF THE COURT FINDS SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE OF INTENT, SUCH EVIDENCE CAN ONLY 
SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED MANSLAUGHTER. 
Although Mr. Johnson maintains that the evidence does not 
support a finding of the intent element, in the event this Court 
disagrees, the evidence nevertheless cannot support a conviction for 
attempted first degree murder because Mr. Johnson "reasonably 
believefd] the circumstances provide[d] a legal justification or 
excuse for his conduct although the conduct is not legally 
justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances." Utah 
Code Ann. §76-5-205 (1953 as amended). The evidence of this tragic 
incident shows that Mr. Johnson was shot in the back by Trooper 
Bringhurst before Mr. Johnson wounded the trooper. Under those 
circumstances, Mr. Johnson reasonably believed he was justified in 
defending his life. Because of such a reasonable belief, Mr. 
Johnson is not guilty of and should not have been convicted of 
attempted first degree murder. If his self-defending conduct is to 
be punished at all it can only be for the crime of attempted 
manslaughter. 
The evidence shows that Trooper Bringhurst panicked when 
he saw the gun in Mr. Johnson's car. The trooper approached the car 
that night "in a carefree, happy-go-lucky" manner. (T. 82). He felt 
"cocky" that he was about to arrest a drunk (T. 512). In such a 
carefree state, Trooper Bringhurst claimed to see the gun move 
across Mr. Johnson's lap and reacted by "starting to move" (T. 84). 
Bringhurst remembered seeing a "bright light" at this moment' the 
bright light was the last thing he remembered seeing (T. 84-6). 
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Trooper Bringhurst did not remember firing his first 
shot. He only remembered seeing Mr. Johnson's gun, seeing a bright 
light and hearing a loud noise. In that instant of surprise, 
shocking him out of his "happy-go-lucky" frame of mind, the trooper 
was convinced that he was going to be killed (T. 148). At that 
moment the trooper distinctly remembered throwing his body backwards 
and reaching for his gun (T. 84-5). 
Although Trooper Bringhurst did not remember pulling the 
trigger, he fired four shots at Mr. Johnson. Trooper Bringhurst 
remembered only the sound of the gunfire (T. 86). The next thing 
the trooper remembered was looking at Mr. Johnson seated behind the 
wheel in his car with the car door closed (T. 86-87). He then aimed 
and fired his fifth and final shot at Mr. Johnson (T. 86-87). 
The only other person who witnessed the events of those 
crucial moments was Officer Evans. Officer Evans was less than one 
block away from the scene when he heard the first shot (T. 223). 
The officer heard two more shots before he reached Paxton Avenue (T. 
224). Officer Evans testified that he could not distinguish between 
the sounds of the shots "other than that they were very loud and 
were very close to where I was at." (T. 225). 
When he arrived at the scene, he saw Trooper Bringhurst 
"fire three more rounds into the car" (T. 224). Officer Evans saw 
the trooper standing "approximately two feet to the side of the 
vehicle and he was a couple of feet behind the driver's door" when 
he first saw him fire into Mr. Johnson's car (T. 225). Officer 
Evans did not remember whether the driver's door was open or closed 
(T. 227). 
The objective physical evidence is the only other 
evidence pertaining to these critical moments. The physical 
evidence establishing that Mr. Johnson was shot in the back more 
than once (T. 567-568) and that Mr. Johnson could not have been 
seated in his car with the door closed when he was hit (T. 364, 
568). Mr. Johnson was either outside the car as he testified (T. 
579-580)/ or turned around while seated in the car so his back was 
directly facing Trooper Bringhurst. 
What happened during the crucial moments when both 
Trooper Bringhurst and Mr. Johnson were wounded is decisive of 
whether Mr. Johnson is guilty of the crime for which he was 
sentenced or the lesser crime of attempted manslaughter. If Trooper 
Bringhurst shot Mr. Johnson first in a moment of panic and lack of 
consciousness, Mr. Johnson was reasonable in his belief that he had 
a right to shoot back in an attempt to save his own life. Mr. 
Johnson testified to the jury that he was shot first as he was 
attempting to get out of his car (T. 581). Mr. Johnson's 
recollection of those moments is corroborated by the physical facts 
and the testimony of Officer Evans. 
The evidence of reasonable belief of a right to shoot in 
self-defense was found insufficient to warrant an instruction on 
voluntary manslaughter in State v. Manus, 597 P.2d 280 (N.M. 1979) 
(cited with approval in State v. Castonguay.) Manus is 
distinguishable on the facts from the instant case. The Court 
assessed the evidence in Manus: 
The State's evidence showed that Manus was angry 
about the officer stopping his wife, got his 
shotgun, loaded it, approached the scene in a trot 
with a loaded gun, had some words with the officers, 
refused to put his shotgun down when told to do so, 
pointed the shotgun at Switzer, and ultimately fired 
at Wasmer, after which he threatened that he would 
"get" Switzer also. 
Manus, 587 P.2d at 285. The State's evidence in the instant case 
does not show that Mr. Johnson was angry with Trooper Bringhurst. 
The evidence does not show that Trooper Bringhurst instructed Mr. 
Johnson to put the gun down nor that Trooper Bringhurst gave Mr. 
Johnson a chance to comply with such an instruction. The evidence 
does not show that Mr. Johnson pointed the gun at the trooper. The 
evidence does not show that Mr. Johnson ever voiced any threats 
toward Trooper Bringhurst or Officer Evans or any other officer on 
the scene that night. 
Unlike Manus, the evidence in the instant case shows that 
Trooper Bringhurst panicked and started shooting without pausing to 
see or hear any of Mr. Johnson's actions, let alone pausing to 
instruct Mr. Johnson to put down the gun and get out of the car. 
The evidence shows that Trooper Bringhurst fired four shots before 
he assessed what was happening. The only evidence of the trooper 
being shot first is the testimony of Trooper Bringhurst, and he does 
not remember what happened. The evidence in this case supports a 
conviction for nothing more than attempted manslaughter. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
REFUSING TO SUPPRESS MR. JOHNSONfS MISDEMEANOR 
THEFT CONVICTIONS. 
Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to suppress Mr. 
Johnson's prior convictions pursuant to Rule 609 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence (1983) (R. 204-5). The trial court refused to suppress 
two prior misdemeanor convictions for theft, ruling that they were 
crimes of dishonesty or false statement under Rule 609(a)(2)/ Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1983).3 (R. 1529). 
The trial court relied on State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33 
(Utah 1984) in determining that the prior misdemeanor theft 
convictions were admissible (R. 1527). However, Cintron is not 
controlling in determining whether theft is a crime of dishonesty 
since Cintron was decided under the rules of evidence which were in 
effect prior to the adoption of the federal rules. The federal 
rules were to provide a fresh starting place for the law of 
evidence, were to supplant all inconsistent rules and statutes and 
3
 On direct examination, Mr. Johnson acknowledged the two prior 
misdemeanor theft convictions after the trial court denied the 
motion to suppress such convictions (T. 659). Policy considerations 
and fundamental fairness demand that where a motion to suppress 
prior convictions is denied, a defendant be permitted to bring out 
such convictions on direct examination, while preserving the issue 
for appeal. To do otherwise would grant unwarranted advantage to 
the State. The jury would doubtfully understand a legal 
technicality forbidding the defendant from being completely truthful 
and honest with the jury about prior convictions; and when such 
information was "uncovered" by the State on cross examination, the 
jury would unconsciously, if not consciously, discount the 
credibility of the defendant. The jury would infer from the 
defendant's conduct an intent on his part to hide or hope to hide 
the information of prior convictions. 
were to be interpreted by looking to federal case law. See State v. 
Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986). 
Rule 609(a)(2)# Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) is a 
verbatim replica of the federal rule. While there is a split of 
authority among the federal circuits as to whether burglary and 
theft are crimes of dishonesty or false statement within the meaning 
of Rule 609(a)(2), the "more persuasive and better reasoned . . . 
decisions hold [ ] that burglary and theft not arising from 
fraudulent conduct are not crimes of dishonesty or false statement" 
under the rule. See State v. Morehouse/ 748 P.2d 217 (Ut. App. 
1988) (J. Jackson, dissenting at 222 n. 2). 
In United States v. Smith/ 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976), 
which this Court cited favorably in State v. Banner/ the circuit 
court discussed in detail the legislative history of Rule 609(a) 
pointing out the heated debate which spawned the formulation of the 
rule. That court quoted the Conference Committee Report which 
stated: 
By the phrase "dishonesty and false statement" the 
Conference means crimes such as perjury or 
subornation of perjury/ false statement, criminal 
fraud, embezzlement/ or false pretensef or any other 
offense in the nature of crimen falsi/ the 
commission of which involves some element of deceit, 
untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the 
accused's propensity to testify truthfully. 
Smith, 551 F.2d at 362, (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1597, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. 
News, pp. 7098, 7103). The intent of Congress was to limit the 
introduction of prior convictions for impeachment purposes only to 
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those crimes which bear directly on a witness1 propensity to not 
tell the truth. 
In United States v. Millings, 535 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 
1976), the court reasoned: 
An intent to deceive or defraud is not an element 
of either offense. . . . Certainly we cannot say 
that either offense, in the language of the 
Conference Committee, is "peculiarly probative of 
credibility.11 Although it may be argued that any 
wilful violation of law. . . evinces a lack of 
character and a disregard for all legal duties, 
including the obligations of an oath, Congress has 
not accepted that expansive theory. 
535 F.2d at 123. 
In United States v. Glenn, 667 P.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1982), 
the court held that the crimes of burglary and grand theft were not 
admissible under Rule 609 (a)(2) without a showing of accompanying 
fraudulent or deceitful conduct. The burden rests with the State to 
make such a showing. Generally, the court observed that crimes of 
violence, theft crimes and crimes of stealth do not involve 
"dishonesty or false statement" within the proper meaning of Rule 
609 (a)(2). See also United States v. Seamster, 568 F.2d 188 (10th 
Cir. 1978). 
The Fifth Circuit held that a prior conviction for felony 
theft could not be used for impeachment purposes under Rule 609 
(a)(2) because a prior theft does not bear upon the propensity of a 
witness to testify truthfully. The court stated that felony theft 
does not involve "dishonesty or false statement" of the 
credibility-deteriorating quality contemplated by Rule 609(a)(2). 
Howard v. Gonzales, 658 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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In the present case, neither of the misdemeanor theft 
convictions should have been admitted. The 1985 misdemeanor theft 
conviction contained no element of deceit and, under the cases 
outlined above, was inadmissible under Rule 609(a)(2), The 
circumstances of the 1982 theft by deception conviction were not 
established by the state. While the prosecutor did attempt to 
proffer the circumstances of that theft (after the Court's ruling) 
(R. 1526-7), no evidence was presented and the trial court 
disregarded that attempted proffer, ruling that theft in general fit 
within 609(a)(2) (R. 1525-9). 
Mr. Johnson's defense was based in part on his testimony 
that Trooper Bringhurst fired first. (See discussion supra at 4, 
14, 23) Mr. Johnson's credibility was therefore of utmost 
importance. The state emphasized Mr. Johnson's convictions, arguing 
in closing that "We know Danny Johnson is a dishonest man" because 
of his prior convictions (R. 713). This Court has acknowledged the 
prejudicial effect of prior convictions in State v. Pacheco, 712 
P.2d 192 (Utah 1985) reh'g denied, January 8, 1986, and State v. 
Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985). Furthermore, as Justice 
Zimmerman pointed out in his concurring opinion in State v. Bishop, 
75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 47 (1988): 
This Court's decisions have consistently recognized 
that an accused is almost certainly prejudiced 
unfairly when evidence of unrelated crimes or bad 
acts is introduced because of "the tendency of a 
fact finder to convict the accused because of bad 
character rather than because he [or she] is shown 
to be guilty of the offenses charged." State v. 
Saunders, 699 P.2d at 741. For this reason, "such 
evidence is presumed prejudicial and, absent a 
reason for the admission of the evidence other than 
to show criminal disposition, the evidence is 
excluded." id. 
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Because the trial court erred in allowing evidence of Mr. Johnson's 
misdemeanor theft convictions, resulting in prejudice since the 
jury's perception as to whether Mr. Johnson intentionally committed 
the crime was undoubtedly affected by its knowledge of his prior 
convictions, the conviction in the present case should be reversed 
and the case remanded for a new trial. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE BLOODY 
CLOTHING OF TROOPER BRINGHURST BECAUSE THE 
PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF SUCH EVIDENCE 
SUBSTANTIALLY OUTWEIGHED THE PROBATIVE VALUE. 
Over defense objection, the trial court admitted into 
evidence as state's exhibits 41 and 42, the bloody clothing Trooper 
Bringhurst wore on the night of the incident (T. 159-60, 175). 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence. 
Utah Code Ann. Vol. 9B (Supp. 1984). 
In deciding whether a piece of evidence should be 
excluded under Rule 403, the trial court must determine whether the 
item has probative value and, if so, whether that probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect of such 
evidence. The trial court abused its discretion in the instant case 
in finding that the probative value of the bloody clothing was equal 
to or greater than the prejudicial effect and therefore admissible 
under Rule 403 (T. 160). 
In deciding whether an item of evidence has probative 
value, two central considerations are, first, "how strong a 
tendency" the proffered evidence has to prove an issue of 
consequence in the litigation, and second, the proponent's need for 
the evidence. United States v. Grassi, 602 F.2d 1192, 1195 (5th 
Cir. 1979). As this Court stated, relevance is determined according 
to whether the evidence will assist the trier of fact in 
understanding the nature of the crime or the manner in which a crime 
was committed. State v. Royball, 710 P.2d 168 (Utah 1985). 
In State v. Chappie, 660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz. 1983) the court 
held the trial court erred by admitting pictures of the deceased 
victim because the photographs did not have probative value as to 
whether the defendant was in fact the perpetrator. The fact that 
the victim was killed, the medical cause of his death, and what was 
done with his body after death were not in controversy. The court 
held that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the 
photographs since they had little probative value and were 
cumulative of undisputed testimony. 
In United States v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 
1979) cert, denied 99 S.Ct. 2894, the Court stressed the necessity 
when considering the probative value of evidence, of assessing the 
prosecutor's need for the evidence. The Court of Appeals considered 
the value of prior crime evidence, commenting: 
When the government has ample evidence to establish 
an element of the crime, the probative value of the 
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prior crime evidence is greatly reduced, and the 
risk of prejudice which accompanies the admission of 
such evidence will not be justified. 
Similarly, in State v. Bishop, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Utah 
1988), this Court reasoned that photographs showing the head wounds 
of victim Cunningham were improperly admitted under Rule 403 as the 
evidence had minimal probative value, "being essentially cumulative 
of unchallenged expert and lay testimony identifying the remains and 
the causes of death". Id. at 29. 
In State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1986), reh'g 
denied, July 29, 1986, this Court noted that before prejudicial 
photographs may be admitted, it must be established that the 
evidence "conveyfs] relevant information that cannot readily be 
provided to the jury by less potentially prejudicial means." Id. 
(citing State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810, 813 (1979)).4 
While clothing may be allowed as an exhibit, it should be 
allowed in as evidence only if it assists the trier of fact in 
understanding the nature of the crime charged or how that crime was 
committed. Royball, 710 P.2d at 168. Further, a victim's clothing 
has been allowed in as evidence when it connects an accused with a 
4
 In State v. Poe, 441 P.2d 512 (Utah 1968) this Court found the 
inflammatory nature of photographs of the victim outweighed their 
probative value, concluding: 
In the instant case they have no probative value. All 
the material facts which could conceivably have been 
adduced from a viewing of the slides had been established 
by uncontradicted lay and medical testimony. The only 
purpose served was to inflame and arouse the jury. 
Id. at 515. 
cont. on page 33 
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crime, proves an individual's identity, or throws relevant light on 
a material matter at issue. Jennings v. State, 506 P.2d 931 (Okl. 
Crim. App. 1973). But a victim's clothing is not to be admitted 
when it does not shed light on a relevant fact and its chief effect 
is one of arousing passion and prejudice in the individual jurors' 
minds. Id. 
In the present case, the bloody clothing had no probative 
value in regard to any of the issues raised at trial. The defense 
did not contest that the shooting occurred, that Trooper Bringhurst 
was injured or the extent of the trooper's injuries (T. 159-60). 
The state in essence conceded that the bloody clothing was merely 
cumulative, and was not necessary to an issue raised at trial when 
it acknowledged that the clothing was only needed to "corroborate" 
Bringhurst's testimony (T. 160). 
In addition to Bringhurst's testimony, the state had the 
benefit of the testimony of lay and expert witnesses to establish 
4 cont. 
In State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810 (Utah 1979), the court 
weighed the impact of acceptance into evidence photographs of the 
murder victim's bullet wound when there was no dispute as to the 
shooting or cause of death. Even though the conviction was affirmed 
the court stated: 
Because the defendant did not dispute shooting Dirks, and 
because the medical examiner testified that the victim 
died as a result of the gunshot, the admission of the 
photographs was superfluous. We do not condone the 
admission of the photographs in this case, since we are 
able to find no evidentiary value for the photographs 
other than the hoped for emotional impact on the jury. 
Id. at 813. 
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the nature and extent of Bringhurst's injuries. Dr. Bryce Allred 
testified to the extent of Bringhurst's wounds and the treatment Dr. 
Allred performed (T. 185, 194-5). Exhibit 35, a photograph, showed 
the shotgun pellet wounds on Bringhurst's face and ear (T. 185). 
Exhibits 36 and 37 were photographs of Bringhurst on the day of his 
discharge from the hospital (T. 202). 
In State v. Steele, 586 P.2d 1274 (Ariz. 1978), the trial 
court allowed into evidence a bloodstained shirt of a victim of a 
shooting as the prosecution had stated they believed the bloodied 
shirt was "corroborative of the entire situation." Id. at 1278. 
The Supreme Court of Arizona held that the trial court abused its 
discretion in admitting such clothing, and stated: 
The admission of gruesome objects such as 
photographs, clothing, and weapons, when introduced 
for no other purpose than to inflame and arouse the 
passions of the jury, can lead to a conviction 
resulting from the jury's revulsion and not from the 
state's proving the elements of the crime. 
Id. at 1276. 
While the court in Steele added that gruesome evidence is 
admissible when the probative value outweighs the potential to 
prejudice the jury, the court stated that if the sole purpose of an 
item of evidence is to prejudice the jury, "we will not hesitate to 
reverse on appeal." Id. The reviewing court found that the bloody 
shirt added little, if anything, to the state's case and 
acknowledged that while cumulative evidence is permissible in 
certain situations, where evidence adds nothing for the juror's 
consideration and is intended to arouse and inflame the emotions of 
the jury, it is reversible error. lei. at 1278. In this case, where 
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the bloody clothing added nothing for the jury's consideration, it 
had no probative value and the trial court erred in admitting it. 
Even if this court determines that the bloody clothing 
had some minimal probative value, it is inadmissible under Rule 403 
if that probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
prejudicial effect. In determining whether evidence unduly 
prejudices a defendant under Rule 403, the focus is on whether the 
evidence has an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper 
basis, such as an emotional determination rather than a factual 
one. Notes of the Advisory Committee on Proposed Federal Rules of 
Evidence, 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 403 at 102. id. at 1216. 
In State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988), in the 
context of gruesome photographs, this Court recognized that: 
inherent in certain categories of relevant evidence 
is an unusually strong propensity to unfairly 
prejudice, inflame, or mislead a jury. Evidence in 
these categories is uniquely subject to being used 
to distort the deliberative process and improperly 
skew the outcome. Consequently, when evidence 
falling within such a category is offered, we have 
required a showing of unusual probative value before 
it is admissible. 
Id. at 1267. 
The prejudicial effect of the bloody clothing 
substantially outweighed any minimal probative value. Trooper 
Bringhurst received a head injury, spilling blood onto his 
clothing. Rather than allowing uncontested testimony regarding 
Bringhurst's wounds to suffice, the court admitted the clothing 
Bringhurst was wearing at the time of the shooting. Such evidence 
was inflammatory, conjuring up a myriad of possible interpretations 
- 35 -
for even the most objective of jurors and arousing sympathy and 
support for Bringhurst. The vivid display of blood and gore would 
affect the emotions of even the coldest juror. Because the 
prejudicial effect of the bloody clothing outweighed any probative 
value, the trial court erred in admitting it. 
The trial court's error in admitting the bloody clothing 
is grounds for reversal. In numerous cases, appellate courts have 
reversed a conviction where the probative value of evidence is 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect, especially in situations where 
the evidence was introduced for its inflammatory effect. See 
generally State v. Beers, 448 P.2d 104 (Ariz. App. 1968); Oxendine 
v. State, 335 P.2d 940 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958); State v. Poe, 441 
P.2d 512 (Utah 1968); State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750 (Utah 1986); and 
State v. Steele, 586 P.2d 1274 (Ariz. 1978). 
The standard for reversal is whether there exists a 
reasonable probability or likelihood that there would have been a 
result more favorable to the defendant in absence of the error. 
State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1352 (Utah 1977). 
In the present case, where Mr. Johnson's defense was 
based on lack of intent. Mr. Johnson testified that Trooper 
Bringhurst had panicked and shot him before Johnson fired a shot 
(T. 579, 581). Under such circumstances, a reasonable likelihood 
exists that the result would have been more favorable had the bloody 
clothing which aroused sympathy and support for the injured trooper 
and inflamed the jury not been admitted into evidence. 
- 36 -
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
THE TESTIMONY OF JEAN HICKHAM. 
Defense counsel made a pretrial motion to exclude the 
testimony of Jean Hickham (R. 111). The trial court denied the 
motion (R. 118). Defense counsel renewed the motion prior to Ms. 
Hickham's testimony, arguing that the testimony was not relevant and 
was not related to the shooting and, in the alternative, even if it 
were relevant, the probative value did not outweigh the prejudicial 
effect of the testimony (T. 592-4). The trial court denied the 
motion on the grounds that the statements were relevant and the 
probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect (T. 597). 
A. THE TESTIMONY WAS NOT RELEVANT. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. Rule 
402, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983). Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence is controlling in determining relevance. State v. Gray, 
717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986). Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as 
follows: 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is 
of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence. 
In addition, Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1983) provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. 
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In State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1176 (Utah 1982), 
this Court emphasized that "evidence is admissible if, and only if, 
it is relevant to prove some fact that is material to the crime 
charged." 
In State v. Starks, 581 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1978), this Court 
pointed out that evidence that a witness had lied on previous 
occasions, had resigned from his position as a deputy sheriff under 
pressure and had not followed proper procedures regarding the 
turning in of narcotics was not relevant to the determination of 
guilt or innocence of the defendant, and stated that ff[t]he better 
reasoned cases hold that conduct where no conviction is had is not 
admissible to impeach a witness." Id. at 1016 (citations omitted). 
In State v. Goodliffe, 578 P.2d 1288 (Utah 1978), the 
state introduced evidence of prior complaints against the defendant 
for the articulated purpose of attacking the defendant's 
credibility. This Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, 
stating that "[b]are, unproven allegations or 'complaints1 of prior 
incidents of similar conduct have no relevancy to the issue of 
defendant's truthfulness or veracity." Goodliffe at 1290. Hence, 
the unproven allegations of Jean Hickham were not admissible to 
attack Mr. Johnson's credibility. 
In State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 1980), this 
Court pointed out that it had "stated on numerous occasions that 
evidence of other crimes allegedly committed by the defendant is not 
admissible if the purpose is to disgrace the defendant as a person 
of evil character with a propensity to commit crime and thus likely 
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to have committed the crime charged." However, the Daniels Court 
found that the trial court had not erred in admitting evidence that 
the defendant had stolen gasoline in order to drive a vehicle from 
Utah to California since the evidence was relevant to the 
circumstances surrounding the crime and aided the state in 
establishing that the defendant intended to permanently deprive the 
owner of the vehicle. 
In the instant case, the state argued that the testimony 
of Jean Hickham was relevant to Mr. Johnson's intent in shooting 
Trooper Bringhurst (T. 594). Jean Hickham testified that several 
hours before the incident, she had talked to Mr. Johnson on the 
telephone for approximately 30-45 minutes (T. 713). She stated that 
Mr. Johnson was upset because his girlfriend was seeing another man, 
Michael Polton (T. 714-6). Hickham told the officer that 
Mr. Johnson threatened to tear Polton's legs off, blow his head off, 
blow up the apartment, and shoot any officer who got in his way 
(T. 716, 720-1, 738). Hickham also testified that she heard a gun 
clicking in the background (T. 717).5 
While the testimony of Jean Hickham, if believed, 
suggests a propensity for violence on the part of Mr. Johnson, it 
does not address the issue of whether Mr. Johnson intended to shoot 
b
 Hickham testified that she exaggerated in giving her statements to 
the police and that she was intoxicated on the night in question, 
had difficulty remembering details, and had made up certain 
statements she made to the police (T. 721, 723, 728, 730). She also 
testified that she did not remember Danny threatening to shoot any 
police officer who got in the way of his carrying out his threats 
against the apartment or Polton (T. 730). 
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Trooper Bringhurst. The focus of the threats was Michael Polton and 
Mr. Johnson's girlfriend; the threatened violence was directed 
against the pair and the apartment in which they were located, not 
at a highway patrol officer, several hours later and many miles 
away. The statement that Mr. Johnson would shoot any officer who 
got in his way referred to an officer who might attempt to interfere 
with the threatened violence at the apartment not an officer who 
stopped him several hours later for driving under the influence. 
Unlike the situation in Daniels where the siphoning of 
the gas was integral to the defendant's story that he had little 
money and had taken the car in order to get to California, the 
conversation several hours prior to the incident had nothing to do 
with the shooting of Officer Bringhurst, other than to suggest that 
Mr. Johnson had a character for violence and acted in conformity 
therewith in shooting the trooper. Jean Hickham's belief that she 
heard a gun clicking in the background is similarly irrelevant to 
the issue of whether Mr. Johnson intended to shoot Trooper 
Bringhurst since there was no issue in this case as to whether Mr. 
Johnson had a gun. Because it was not relevant to any issue in this 
case, the trial court erred in admitting Jean Hickham's testimony. 
B. THE TESTIMONY OF JEAN HICKHAM WAS MORE PREJUDICIAL 
THAN PROBATIVE AND WORKED MORE TOWARD IMPEACHING 
MR. JOHNSON'S CHARACTER RATHER THAN ASSISTING 
THE TRIER OF FACT. 
Evidence may be excluded at trial if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Rule 403, 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) provides: 
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Although relevant, evidence may be exlucded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence. 
Utah Code Ann. Vol. 9B (Supp. 1984). 
Unfair prejudice means an undue tendency to suggest a 
decision on a improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an 
emotional one. Notes of the Advisory Committee on Proposed Federal 
Rules of Evidence, 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 403 at 102. 
In United States v. Cook, 538 F.2d 1000, 1004 (3d Cir. 
1976), the Court stated that in applying a balancing test in 
determining whether to admit evidence of other crimes, a court must 
consider the government's actual need for that evidence since proof 
of a prior offense has a high potential for arousing the jury 
against the accused creating a significant risk of undue prejudice 
for the accused. As this Court noted in Goodliffe, 578 P.2d at 
1290, prior incidents are often not relevant to an issue at trial 
and will conjur up speculation and prejudice with the jury. 
In State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985) this 
Court stated that admitting evidence of prior crimes tends to lead a 
fact finder to convict the accused because of bad character rather 
than because the defendant has been found guilty of the offenses 
charged (Citing State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1178 (Utah 1982)). 
Saunders also noted that evidence of prior crimes is presumed 
prejudicial and absent a reason to admit the evidence is to be 
excluded. Id. 
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Two dangers inherent in admitting evidence of specific 
acts of misconduct are (1) a jury may determine that the defendant 
is a "bad man" and convict on lesser evidence than would ordinarily 
be required; and (2) if such evidence is allowed a defendant faces 
the possibility of having to defend an entire lifetime of incidents 
in a single trial. Starks, 581 P.2d at 1017 citing State v. 
Johnson, 383 P.2d 862 (Ariz. 1963). 
In Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 283 
(3d Cir. 1976), the Third Circuit held that in the interest of 
protecting a defendant's presumption of innocence, prior acts should 
not be allowed to reach the jury. The court's rationale was that a 
defendant's previous brushes with the law are irrelevant to his 
guilt or innocence of the crime with which he is charged and a 
defendant must not be convicted based on guilt by reputation. As 
the court noted, when such evidence reaches the jury, it is 
difficult if not impossible to assume the continued integrity of the 
presumption of innocence. "A drop of ink cannot be removed from a 
glass of milk." Id. 
In the instant case, the testimony of Jean Hickham 
pointed out prior bad acts by Mr. Johnson. In addition to the 
inherent prejudice that evidence of such misconduct creates, the 
specifics of Ms. Hickham's testimony tends to mislead and confuse 
the jury. As previously outlined, the focus of the conversation was 
on Polton and Mr. Johnson's girlfriend and the apartment in which 
they were located. The aside allegedly made by Mr. Johnson that he 
would shoot any officer that attempted to interfere is confusing in 
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this instance where an officer was actually shot. While there is no 
evidence that at the time of the Bringhurst shooting, Mr. Johnson 
was attempting to carry out his threats made several hours earlier 
or that Trooper Bringhurst was interfering with such an attempt to 
carry out threats, the jury could have easily misinterpreted the 
statement and focused on it in deciding that Mr. Johnson intended to 
shoot Trooper Bringhurst. 
The prejudicial effect of Jean Hickham's testimony 
regarding unproven prior bad acts of Mr. Johnson, coupled with the 
confusion of the issues as a result of such testimony substantially 
outweighed any minimal probative value of the testimony, and the 
trial court abused its discretion in permitting such testimony. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR IN ADMITTING THE 
TESTIMONY OF JEAN HICKHAM WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
The standard for determining whether the error in 
admitting the Hickham testimony requires reversal is whether the 
outcome would likely have been different had the testimony not been 
admitted. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987). 
This Court has recognized the prejudicial effect of 
admitting prior convictions on numerous occasions. See State v. 
Bishop, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 47 (1988) (Zimmerman, J. concurring). 
Unproven allegations of prior criminal acts are as prejudicial, if 
not more so, since they are presented to the jury without 
establishing that they in fact occurred, thereby disturbing the 
defendant's presumption of innocence. 
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In the present case, Mr. Johnson testified that he did 
not intend to shoot Trooper Bringhurst and that the Trooper reacted 
when he saw the gun in Mr. Johnson's car and began firing at Mr. 
Johnson (T. 579, 580). The trooper had difficulty remembering 
details surrounding the shooting, but claimed that the shooting 
began with a "boom" and bright lights, suggesting that Mr. Johnson 
fired the shotgun first.6 The jury had to decide whether to believe 
the imprecise testimony of Trooper Bringhurst which was contradicted 
by the testimony of Officer Evans and the physical evidence (See 
discussion supra at 9-18) or the testimony of Mr. Johnson. Under 
such circumstances, evidence which painted Mr. Johnson as a violent 
person and confusing testimony regarding an alleged threat to shoot 
a police officer, prejudiced the jury's view of Mr. Johnson and made 
it almost certain that the jury would disbelieve Mr. Johnson's 
testimony. The highly prejudicial nature of Hickham's testimony 
affected the outcome of this case, requiring reversal and a new 
trial. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR WHEN 
IT DENIED THE MOTION FOR MISTRIAL AFTER OFFICER OLSEN 
TESTIFIED THAT HE WAS GUARDING MR. JOHNSON 
TO STOP ANY ESCAPE ATTEMPTS. 
During the direct examination of police Officer Vernon 
Olsen the following colloquy took place: 
6 Defense counsel established that the trooper had difficulty 
remembering the details of the incident through the testimonies of 
Tom Walsh, a reporter, and Lt. Fallows. See discussion, infra at 
53-58. 
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Q. (prosecutor) Are you familiar with the defendant, 
Danny Lee Johnson? 
A. (Officer Olsen) Yes, I am. 
Q. And how did you come to know him? 
A. I spent guard duty one day up at the hospital on him. 
. . . 
Q. And what is hospital guard duty? 
A. Basically you're there to stop any escape attempts. 
T. 387-8). 
Counsel for Mr. Johnson made an immediate objection 
(T. 387) and later moved for a mistrial (T. 455-6). The trial court 
erroneously denied the motion (T. 458). 
The prosecutor impermissibly elicited the comment that 
Mr. Johnson was an "escape risk" and thereby prejudiced the jury 
against Mr. Johnson. Labeling Mr. Johnson an escape risk connotes 
violence and dangerousness, thereby permitting the jury to utilize 
that characterization to assume he committed the violent and 
dangerous acts of which he was charged. Current case law and the 
Utah Rules of Evidence do not permit the admissibility of such 
prejudicial evidence, therefore the trial court committed reversible 
error by denying the motion for a mistrial. 
In a line of cases culminating in State v. Saunders, 699 
P.2d 738 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held 
that evidence of prior crimes is not admissible to show criminal 
disposition. This Court has explained that such evidence is 
"presumed prejudicial and that absent a reason for admission other 
than to show criminal disposition, is excluded." Id. at 741. While 
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the characterization of an individual as an "escape risk" is not 
evidence of prior crimes, it suggests that the individual is likely 
to commit such a crime, and shares the same problems and concerns as 
evidence of prior convictions. 
In State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110, 112-13 (Utah 1986), this 
Court stated, 
[T]he term "prejudicial" should be construed to mean 
inflammatory in the sense that the jury may use the 
conviction against the defendant for purposes other 
than determining the defendant's credibility, and 
therefore would tend to induce the jury to render a 
verdict outside the relevant substantive evidence 
bearing on the material elements of the crime. 
The dangerousness and violence implicit in "escape risk" similarly 
prejudices the jury against the accused because that 
characterization affects the jury, inducing the jurors to consider 
factors outside the relevant evidence of the crimes charged. 
Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) would 
preclude the prosecutor from eliciting evidence that an individual 
is an escape risk, since such evidence cannot be utilized to show 
that the accused acted in conformity with a particular character 
trait in committing the instant offense. Since Saunders and Slowe 
point out that the concern in allowing such evidence is that the 
jury will transfer the danger and violence implicit in a 
characterization of an individual as an escape risk to the violence 
and dangerousness of the shooting Mr. Johnson was charged with, it 
was improper and impermissible for the prosecutor to explicitly 
request such evidence from a witness. The solicited evidence had no 
other evidentiary purpose and functioned only to predispose the jury 
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to a finding of guilt on the current crimes charged because of Mr. 
Johnson's presumed violent and dangerous character. 
The presentation of the "escape risk" statement in the 
instant case is analogous to those cases where the jury is 
inadvertently allowed to view the accused in handcuffs, shackles, or 
jail clothes. See generally Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 
(1976); People v. Duran, 545 P.2d 1322 (Cal. 1976). 
In State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 (Utah 1973), this Court 
established a two-prong consideration for determining the 
appropriate remedy: (a) whether the jury was allowed to consider 
matters it was otherwise not justified in considering; and (b) 
whether the jury was likely influenced by that information. Id. at 
426. 
As outlined above, the first prong of the Valdez test was 
met in the instant case since the prosecutor improperly introduced 
the characterization of Mr. Johnson as an escape risk; the jury was 
not otherwise entitled to hear such information. 
In State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984), this Court 
reaffirmed Valdez and clarified that in considering the second 
prong, whether the jury was influenced by the information, it is 
appropriate to consider the evidence of the defendant's guilt. This 
Court acknowledged that where evidence of guilt is weak, the jury is 
more likely to be influenced by a piece of the information than 
where the evidence is strong. 
As set forth in Point I, supra at 8-20, evidence of Mr. 
Johnson's intent to commit an attempted homicide was not strong in 
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the instant case. The evidence was susceptible to varying 
interpretations as to Mr. Johnson's intent, and the inadmissible 
introduction of Mr. Johnson's alleged escape risk status could have 
sufficiently tipped the balance for the jury in favor of finding him 
to be violent and dangerous and therefore guilty of the crimes 
charged. 
As the comment of Officer Olsen was not admissible and 
should not have been allowed to reach the jury, the trial court 
erred in failing to deny the motion for a mistrial. Accordingly, 
this Court should reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING 
LIEUTENANT DAN FALLOWS A HOSTILE WITNESS 
OR WITNESS ASSOCIATED WITH AN ADVERSE PARTY 
Rule 611(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1983)7 
provides: 
Leading questions should not be used on the direct 
examination of a witness except as may be necessary 
to develop his testimony. Ordinarily leading 
questions should be permitted on cross examination. 
When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse 
party, or a witness identified with an adverse 
party, interrogation maybe by leading questions. 
Rule 611(c) replaced the former Rule 43(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provided in pertinent part: 
A party may interrogate any unwilling or hostile 
witness by leading questions. 
7
 The language of Rule 611(c) of the Federal Rules is identical to 
that of U.R.E. 611(c) (1983) except that the federal rule is gender 
neutral. 
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Rule 611(c) was intended to enlarge the class of 
witnesses considered hostile. Bruce Hughes, Inc. v. Ingles & 
Associates, 653 P.2d 88 (Colo. App. 1982); Ellis v. City of Chicago, 
667 F.2d 606 (7th Cir. 1981). 
Under the old rule 43(b), a party calling a witness was 
required to make a showing of bias or hostility.8 Fajeriak v. 
State, 439 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1968); Haney v. Mizzell Memorial 
Hospital, 744 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1984). However, ff[r]ule 611(c) . 
. . significantly enlarged the class of witnesses presumed hostile, 
'and therefore subject to interrogation by leading questions without 
further showing of actual hostility.1" Haney at 1477-8. 
In the present case, defense counsel called Lt. Fallows, 
an employee of the Utah Highway Patrol, to testify regarding 
statements Trooper Bringhurst made to Lt. Fallows about Bringhurst's 
actions immediately prior to the shooting (T. 499-517). Prior to 
calling Lt. Fallows to the stand, defense counsel requested that she 
be permitted to proceed through the use of leading questions 
pursuant to Rule 611(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) so as 
to avoid eliciting irrelevant information. Defense counsel argued 
that Lt. Fallows was a hostile witness or a witness identified with 
8
 In United States v. Bryant, 461 F.2d 912 (1972), the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that "where the defense calls a government 
agent or person closely identified with the government, it should be 
permitted to lead such a witness unless the government establishes 
that the witness is not hostile or biased against the defense." 
Bryant at 919. Hence, under the more restrictive rule 43, where the 
witness is a government agent, as in the present case, the Sixth 
Circuit shifted the burden to the state to establish lack of bias 
before denying use of leading questions. 
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an adverse party (Trooper Bringhurst and the State) and therefore 
leading questions were appropriate. 
The State, while arguing that leading questions should 
not be permitted, essentially agreed with defense counsel's position 
that the witness was not aligned with the defense, stating that 
Lt. Fallows was a reluctant or uncooperative witness for the defense 
(R. 487-8). Although it was readily apparent that Lt. Fallows was 
identified with the State and Trooper Bringhurst, the Court stated: 
He may be identified with the adverse party but he 
may still be a neutral witness if he's under oath to 
answer truthfully all the questions that are asked. 
T. 490. 
Lt. Fallows was employed by the Highway Patrol, the same 
agency which employed Trooper Bringhurst (T. 491-2). He was a 
personal friend of Trooper Bringhurst and had known him thirteen to 
fourteen years (T. 492). Lt. Fallows acknowledged that he was 
reluctant to testify for the defense, that he was concerned about 
any appearance that he was aiding the defense, that he had strong 
feelings about the outcome of the case, and believed that the proper 
outcome was that Mr. Johnson be convicted (T. 492-3). Lt. Fallows 
refused to talk to defense counsel without the prosecuting attorneys 
being present, and conferred with the prosecutors alone prior to 
talking to defense counsel (T. 493-495). Nevertheless, the trial 
court required defense counsel to proceed using direct questions. 
(T. 498) (See Addendum A for complete transcript of testimony and 
argument regarding defense counsel's request to question Lt. Fallows 
through use of leading questions). 
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In Ellis, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that 
the trial court erred in disallowing the plaintiffs to use leading 
questions when examining two police officers who were employees of 
the defendant city and had worked closely with the individual 
defendant. The Court stated "[the officers] thus clearly qualified 
as 'witness[es] identified with an adverse party' for purposes of 
Rule 611(c)" [of the Federal Rules of Evidence] Ellis at 613. 
Even under the more restrictive Rule 43(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, leading questions were permissible where a 
criminal defendant called a witness associated with the government 
or prosecution. See United States v. Bryant, 461 F.2d 912-17 
(1972). The rationale for allowing leading questions in such an 
instance is that an adverse witness will not be amenable to the 
suggestibility of counsel's leading questions, and "is not likely to 
be tractable on direct examination" Bryant at 919. 
In denying defense counsel's request, the trial court 
abused its discretion. The responses of Lt. Fallows indicated that 
he was an employee of the State and so aligned with Trooper 
Bringhurst and the State that he had the prosecutors advise him 
prior to meeting with defense counsel and had strong feelings about 
the outcome.9 The statements of the trial judge indicate he 
misunderstood the requirements of Rule 611(c) and the issue raised 
by defense counsel that during the examination of Fallows she would 
be able to more directly elicit pertinent information if allowed to 
9 Lt. Fallow's alignment with the State is further exemplified 
by the state's attempt to use him as a rebuttal witness 
(T. 741). 
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lead. The trial judge initially ruled that "we're going to 
have to deny your motion to declare him as a hostile 
witness. . . ." (T. 497). After defense counsel asked the 
trial judge to directly rule on whether Fallows was associated 
with an adverse partyf the trial judge stated in part: 
[I]f he's under oath that he will testify truthfully 
regardless of the outcome, I think the Court is of 
the opinion that until we find out that he's hostile 
that even under 611(c) where it says he may be 
associated with the opposing party, that under the 
circumstances of this case here, that that motion 
should be denied. 
(T. 497). 
The trial court continued to require a showing by defense 
counsel that Lt. Fallows was actually "hostile" even though the 
current Rule 611(c) is not so restrictive. The fact that a witness 
is under oath and agrees to answer truthfully is irrelevant to a 
determination as to whether counsel should be permitted to lead. 
All witnesses take an oath to tell the truth; leading questions are 
used to focus on a specific area of testimony, to elicit information 
which is damaging to the opposition and to avoid eliciting 
irrelevant information. An officer and friend of a fellow 
officer-victim is not likely to offer damaging testimony unless 
pinned down; for that reason, leading questions should be permitted 
in an instance such as this. The trial court erred in believing 
open hostility or animosity is required under the rule. The bias 
of Lt. Fallows was apparent from his testimony; the state conceded 
that he was a reluctant and uncooperative witness. Under such 
circumstances, the trial court erred in denying counsel's request to 
proceed with leading questions. 
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POINT VII. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN ALLOWING EVIDENCE OF OFFICER BRINGHURST'S 
REPUTATION FOR TRUTHFULNESS. 
In rebuttal, the state called two Highway Patrol officers 
to testify that in the opinion of each, Trooper Bringhurst had a 
reputation for being an honest person (T. 765, 768). Prior to such 
testimony, defense counsel objected to the officers being allowed to 
testify as to Bringhurst's character for truthfulness, arguing that 
Rule 608(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) did not permit such 
character evidence unless the witness1 credibility had been attacked 
by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise (T. 761-763). The 
state argued that the prior inconsistent statements which the 
defense brought up through cross-examination and subsequently 
introduced through the testimony of Lt. Fallows and reporter Tom 
Walsh amounted to an attack on Bringhurst's credibility, thereby 
permitting the use of positive character evidence (T. 760-2). The 
trial court overruled defense counsel's objections, and allowed the 
two officers to testify as to Bringhurst's reputation for honesty 
(T. 763-4) . 
Rule 608(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) provides: 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. 
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or 
supported by evidence in the form of opinion or 
reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) 
the evidence may refer only to character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of 
truthful character is admissible only after the 
character of the witness for truthfulness has been 
attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or 
otherwise. 
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While this Court has not decided whether evidence of 
prior inconsistent statements constitutes an attack on credibility 
so as to allow positive character evidence, other courts have held 
that it does not. In Commonwealth v. Sheline, 461 N.E.2d 1197 
(Mass. 1984), the defendant attempted to introduce evidence of his 
character for truthfulness after the state introduced evidence of 
prior inconsistent statements made by him. In affirming the trial 
court's refusal to allow the use of character evidence under such 
circumstances, the Sheline court held that the defendant's character 
for truthfulness was not attacked by the use of prior inconsistent 
statements and pointed out that while prior inconsistent statements 
suggest that a witness' testimony should not be believed, the reason 
for such disbelief "may be found in forcefulness on the part of the 
witness, or in his having been deceived, or in any other possible 
cause." Id. at 1204. The Court further noted that "the disbelief 
sought to be produced is perfectly consistent with an admission of 
his general good character". Id. 
in Ellis v. Ellis, 612 S.W.2d 747 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981), 
the court stated: "Furthermore, a witness or party who has been 
impeached by the use of a prior inconsistent statement may not seek 
to be rehabilitated through the introduction of evidence of his good 
reputation for truth and veracity." Id. at 748. 
In State v. Arnold, 421 A.2d 932, 937 (Me. 1980), the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine pointed out that cross-examination 
which establishes inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a defendant's 
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testimony did not amount to an attack on credibility and use of 
character evidence to rehabilitate the defendant was therefore 
impermissible. 
In the instant case, defense counsel questioned Trooper 
Bringhurst regarding several inconsistencies between his testimony 
at trial and statements he had previously made to Det. Johnson, 
Lt. Fallows and reporter Tom Walsh. The defense subsequently called 
Lt. Fallows and Mr. Walsh to testify to the prior inconsistent 
statements made by Trooper Bringhurst. 
In testifying at trial, Trooper Bringhurst exhibited 
confusion as to whether he was holding his flashlight in his left or 
right hand as he approached Danny Lee Johnson's car and whether he 
flashed the light in the car's mirror (T. 80, 82, 87, 108, 
136-137). Lt. Fallows testified that two days after the incident, 
Trooper Bringhurst told him: 
"I think it was in my right hand at this time. 
Probably changed over when I closed the car door. 
Walked up like this and hit him in the face right 
there and didn't have it. As a matter of fact, the 
street was so light and everything, I didn't even 
have my flashlight in his car." 
Lt. Fallows further testified that his impression was that Trooper 
Bringhurst believed he had the flashlight with him, but was confused 
as to which hand it was in (T. 514). The testimony of Lt. Fallows 
in regard to Bringhurst's prior statements about the flashlight was 
not inconsistent with that of Trooper Bringhurst and exemplified the 
Trooper's inability to recall that detail of the incident; such 
testimony did not attack the credibility of Bringhurst within the 
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meaning of Rule 608(a) and therefore should not trigger the use of 
character evidence under that rule. 
Trooper Bringhurst testified that when he approached the 
subject vehicle, he stopped approximately 5 to 6 feet away (T. 82). 
lit. Fallows testified that Bringhurst told him he stopped 
approximately eighteen inches away (T. 516). This inconsistency 
points to an inability to remember details, especially when taken in 
context of the testimony of Lt. Fallows, elicited by the state on 
cross examination, that Bringhurst was in pain and on medication 
during the interview with Fallows and that Fallows had misgivings 
about the timing of the interview so soon after the incident 
(T. 169, 517, 526). 
Trooper Bringhurst further testified that after asking 
Mr. Johnson "Did you say you have been driving11 (T. 83), Johnson 
responded "It doesn't make any difference, does it? (T. 83). 
Fallows acknowledged that at one point during the interview, 
Bringhurst said he could not remember what Danny Lee Johnson said 
when the Trooper asked his question on approach to the vehicle, but 
that once before that statement and four times following it, 
Bringhurst repeated Johnson's response as "It doesn't make any 
difference, does it" (T. 535). Again the testimony of Fallows 
pointed out problems with recall, not questions as to the 
credibility of Trooper Bringhurst. 
Lt. Fallows testified to several other statements 
Bringhurst had made to him which were either inconsistent with 
Bringhurst's testimony at trial or further clarified that 
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testimony. Bringhurst told Fallows the car was going less than five 
miles per hour before it stopped on Paxton Ave.; at trial Bringhurst 
testified that the car was travelling at ten to twenty miles per 
hour (T. 121, 507-8). Bringhurst could not recall saying that he 
was cocky as he approached the car; Fallows testified that 
Bringhurst had told him he felt cocky (T. 134-5, 512). 
Similarly, the prior inconsistent statement testified to 
by a news reporter did not attack Trooper Bringhurst's credibility. 
Trooper Bringhurst testified that he believed he was going to be 
killed; however, in a statement to the reporter, the trooper said, 
"it did not enter into my mind I was going to be killed" (T. 90, 
148, 546) . 
The inconsistent statements testified to by Lt. Fallows 
and the news reporter pointed out Bringhurst's inability to recall 
details about the incident. As defense counsel argued, pointing out 
such inability to recall does not amount to an attack on credibility. 
As the Court stated in Commonwealth v. Clark, 502 N.E.2d 
564, 569 (Mass. App. 1987), "It is the jury's function, not ours, to 
determine the credibility of witnesses. . . . The testimony of a 
person associated with the court system that the complainant was a 
'very trustworthy person' could have the effect of enhancing the 
complainant's credibility." The court in Clark held that it was 
prejudicial error to allow evidence of character for truthfulness 
when the complainant's testimony had been questioned by prior 
inconsistent statements. 
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The purpose of Rule 608 is to prevent trials from turning 
into "swearing contests" with each side bolstering his or her 
witnesses with other witnesses. Thus a party is only allowed to 
bring in evidence of a witness1 character for truthfulness after 
that witness' character has been attacked. "The mere fact that a 
witness is contradicted by other evidence in a case does not 
constitute an attack upon his reputation for truth and veracity." 
United States v. Danehyy 680 F.2d 1311, 1314 (11th Cir. 1982) 
(citations omitted). 
In the instant case defense counsel never attacked 
Officer Bringhurst's reputation for truthfulness. Thus it was error 
to allow evidence of Officer Bringhurst's reputation for 
truthfulness. This error created a likelihood of injustice and was 
prejudicial because much of the case centered around whether the 
jury believed Mr. Johnson's version of what happened the night of 
the incident or Officer Bringhurst's version. By allowing the 
character evidence, the trial court improperly bolstered Officer 
Bringhurst's credibility and thereby committed prejudicial error. 
POINT VIII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENSE COUNSEL'S 
MOTION FOR MISTRIAL AFTER JURORS BEGAN 
DELIBERATIONS DURING TRIAL. 
A. THE EARLY DELIBERATION VIOLATED MR. JOHNSON'S 
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY 
UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 
The fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides that "no person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property without due process of law." implicit in the 
right to due process is the right to a fair trial. 
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In addition to the fourteenth amendment, due process 
guarantee, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees the right to trial by an impartial jury. Where jurors 
begin deliberations prior to the end of the trial, both the sixth 
amendment impartial jury guarantee and the fourteenth amendment due 
process guarantee are violated. See State v. Washington, 438 A.2d 
1144 (Conn. 1979) . 
In State v. Washington, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
found a due process violation as well as a violation of the right to 
an impartial jury where the trial court had instructed the jurors 
that they could discuss the evidence among themselves before 
submission of the case. The Washington Court acknowledged that it 
is improper for jurors to discuss a case before final instructions 
have been given, and the case has been submitted to them for 
deliberation and pointed out the pitfalls of premature deliberations 
stating that: 
It is human nature that an individual, having 
expressed in discussion his or her view of the guilt 
or innocence of the defendant, would be inclined 
thereafter to give special attention to testimony 
strengthening or confirming the views already 
expressed to fellow jurors [citations omitted]. 
Id. at 114. 
The Washington court reiterated that the "pride of 
opinion and consistency belongs to human nature." j^ d. at 1148 
quoting Winebrenner v. United States, 147 P.2d 322, 328 (8th Cir) 
cert denied, 325 U.S. 863 (1945). Because the state did not show 
that the constitutional deprivation was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the Washington court reversed the conviction and remanded the 
case for a new trial. 
In State v, McGuire, 253 S.E.2d 103 (S.C. 1979), the 
South Carolina Supreme Court pointed out that a jury should not 
begin discussing a case until after the case is submitted to it and 
acknowledged pitfalls similar to those acknowledged by the 
Connecticut Supreme Court in Washington. 
In State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985), this Court 
held that the defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury 
under both the Utah and United States Constitutions was violated 
where a juror engaged in conversation with a state witness. This 
Court acknowledged that in such an instance, a juror may be 
prejudiced even though such prejudice is not provable and the juror 
himself does not recognize it. Id. at 280. 
In the present case, the trial court permitted the 
following exchange to occur in the midst of defense counsel's 
questioning of Trooper Bringhurst: 
Q. Do you recall testifying at the preliminary hearing 
that you saw what you believed to be a shotgun? 
A. It was. 
Q. The question was do you recall making the statement 
that you saw what you believed to be a shotgun. 
A. I don't recall making that statement. 
THE COURT: Just one minute. 
JUROR #6: I have a question. We were told what was said 
in here today is what we're supposed to go by totally; is 
that right? 
THE COURT: Just the evidence. 
JUROR #6: Anything presented today. 
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THE COURT: Any time during the course of a trial the 
only thing you're to consider is the testimony from the 
witness who is talking or any of the evidence that is 
introduced into court. 
JUROR #6: Okay, I'm just wondering. I know myself, I 
cannot remember things that happened — 
T. 153. 
This exchange indicates that early in the trial Juror #6 
was committing himself to the position that Bringhurst's inability 
to remember details was inconsequential and thereby aligning himself 
with the state. 
Although the trial court in the present case did not give 
an explicit instruction allowing for early deliberation as the trial 
court had done in Washington, the trial judge nevertheless committed 
a similar error in permitting the deliberation to occur in open 
court, in front of the other jurors. The statements by Juror #6 
amounted to deliberation since to "deliberate" means ff[t]o weigh, 
ponder, discuss, regard upon, consider" (Washington at 1148 quoting 
Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed.)). 
The concerns set forth in Washington that a juror who 
commits himself to a position will thereafter focus on evidence 
supporting that position and be unlikely to change positions are as 
prevalent in this case where the juror actually expressed his 
opinion not only to other jurors but to all of the courtroom 
personnel and the injured officer as they were in Washington where 
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the Court was concerned with the instruction and there was no 
evidence that a juror actually deliberated prematurely. 
While the facts of Pike are distinguishable from the 
instant case, the concern in Pike that a juror might be tainted but 
unable to recognize such taint is just as applicable to the instant 
case. The other jurors heard the remarks and responded in their own 
minds, either agreeing or disagreeing and thereafter, may well have 
begun focusing on evidence supportive of the state's position. 
Based on the comments of Juror #6 early in the case, jurors may well 
have ignored or discounted the numerous inconsistencies in Trooper 
Bringhurst's testimony and the inability of Trooper Bringhurst to 
remember details of the incident. Although the jurors were not 
questioned regarding the impact of the statements on them, even if 
they had been questioned, they may well have been unable to 
recognize the impact. See Pike at 280. 
The trial court could easily have avoided the impact of 
these early deliberations by controlling the courtroom and not 
allowing the juror to speak. By allowing the comments, the trial 
judge violated Mr. Johnson's right to due process and a fair trial 
by an impartial jury, in violation of the sixth and fourteenth 
amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Not only did the trial judge allow Juror #6 to begin 
deliberations in open court, he also allowed Juror #9 to ask a 
question about the evidence. Juror #9 stated "maybe somebody 
doesn't know. I don't know what a sawed off shotgun is. Is it the 
barrel or the handle or both, or what? You keep talking about a 
sawed off shotgun" (R. 1497-8). The statement of Juror #9 also 
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amounted to early deliberation, and the trial court erred in 
allowing the juror to speak. The statement pointed out to the state 
that it needed to clarify what a sawed off shotgun is and otherwise 
clarify the state's concern regarding the use of that gun. 
Following the statements made by Jurors #6 and #9, 
defense counsel moved for a mistrial (T. 157-8). The Court denied 
the motion (T. 158). 
The early deliberations violated Mr. Johnson's right to a 
fair trial by an impartial jury and amounted to reversible error 
since the state can not establish that they were harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah 
1987). As previously stated, the defense focused on the inaccurate 
and inconsistent testimony of Trooper Bringhurst in attempting to 
establish Mr. Johnson's version that Trooper Bringhurst shot first. 
Where early in the trooper's testimony, a juror informs other jurors 
that the ability to remember details does not matter, it cannot be 
said that the impact on the remaining jurors and the defense's 
ability to establish its case is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
B. THE EARLY DELIBERATIONS VIOLATED MR. JOHNSON'S 
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY UNDER 
THE STATE CONSTITUTION. 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees 
an accused the right to trial by an impartial jury. Article I, §7 
of the Utah Constitution provides an accused the right to due 
process of law. In the event this Court determines that the federal 
constitution does not prohibit the early deliberations which 
- 63 -
occurred in this case, it is nevertheless free to decide that the 
premature deliberations violated the Utah Constitution. See 
generally State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring) and State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986). 
This Court decided Pike on both state and federal 
constitutional grounds. Hence, the concerns regarding tainting the 
jury and establishing such taint are applicable under a state 
analysis as well as a federal one. 
Similarly, the Connecticut Supreme Court decided in 
Washington that the state constitutional guarantees of a right to 
fair trial and impartial jury were violated in that case where the 
judge instructed the jury that it could deliberate before submission 
of the case. Hence, even if this Court determines that the federal 
constitution does not protect against the early juror deliberation, 
the analysis set forth in A above is applicable to the state 
provisions. 
POINT IX. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENSE COUNSEL'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW AND MOTION FOR MISTRIAL WHEN IT 
BECAME NECESSARY FOR HER TO TESTIFY. 
An integral aspect of the defense in this case was 
Mr. Johnson's testimony that he had obtained the two weapons in his 
vehicle earlier in the evening for the purpose of showing them to 
Detective Imig of the West Valley Police Department (T. 576). 
Mr. Johnson testified that almost three years before, Detective Imig 
had asked Mr. Johnson to acquire any illegal guns he came across for 
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the officer (T. 576, 606). The purpose of this information was to 
establish that Danny Lee Johnson did not know that the guns were 
loaded, that he was not driving around looking for an armed 
confrontation and did not intend to kill Trooper Bringhurst. 
Defense counsel had spoken with Detective Imig on the 
telephone on January 8, 1987 (T. 776). At that time, Detective Imig 
did not inform defense counsel that he would be leaving the state 
soon, and would be out of state for six weeks. Id. 
When defense counsel attempted to subpoena Detective Imig 
for trial thirteen days after talking with him, an investigator with 
the defense learned from the West Valley Police Department and a 
return telephone call from the detective that Detective Imig was in 
Southern California and he would not be returning to Utah for 
several weeks (T. 700, 777).10 
Detective Imig returned to Utah as a rebuttal witness for 
the State at State expense on the request of the State (without the 
10 over defense objection that an investigator did not have the 
necessary legal knowledge, the State was allowed to ask the 
investigator: Do you know how to secure the attendance of an 
out-of-state witness? 
Investigator: I don't know all of the specifics but, you 
know, I know somewhat. 
Prosecutor: Did you undertake any of the steps in that 
process? 
Investigator: No ma'am. (T. 702). 
The jury was left with the impression that the investigator failed 
to take adequate steps to bring in a witness when, in reality, a 
lawyer, not an investigator must take those steps. Furthermore, as 
defense counsel argued to the judge, taking the steps to secure an 
out of state witness are meaningless where the witness had indicated 
an unwillingness to cooperate (T. 703). 
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necessity of following the procedures for obtaining out of state 
witnesses), T. 697, 776. 
The Detective testified on direct examination that he met 
Danny Lee Johnson in 1982 and was on a first name basis with Danny 
(T. 6769-70). The detective talked with Danny on the phone at the 
police department numerous times (T. 770). Imig testified that in 
1984 Mr. Johnson had informed him that a man living at 7200 West 
30th South in Magna had a sawed off shotgun in an attempt to arrange 
something (T. 773). 
Although the detective initially testified that he and 
Danny had an ongoing exchange of information regarding illegal 
weapons between 1983 and 1986 (T. 112), he later testified that he 
had not spoken with Danny since September or October, 1985 (T. 774) 
and that in May 1985, his department had decided to discontinue its 
working relationship with Mr. Johnson (T. 772). 
On cross-examination, Detective Imig conceded that he had 
not informed Danny of the department's decision to discontinue 
working with him even though the Detective had spoken with Mr. 
Johnson after that decision had been made (T. 779-80, 772). The 
detective acknowledged that in a phone conversation with defense 
counsel on January 8, 1987, he described an incident where Mr. 
Johnson attempted to meet the Detective at the White Horse Lounge in 
August or September, 1985, to discuss the purchase of illegal guns 
(T. 778, 779). The detective denied telling defense counsel that 
the only reason he and Mr. Johnson did not get together at the White 
Horse Lounge was that they kept missing each other (T. 779). The 
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detective testified to two separate incidents with Mr. Johnson 
involving the purchase of a specific weapon at a specific place (T. 
781). He denied telling defense counsel that the only incident he 
had been involved in with Danny regarding a gun was the 1985 
incident at the White Horse Lounge (T. 781). 
Following Detective Imig's testimony, defense counsel 
moved to withdraw and for a mistrial, based on the necessity of her 
testifying in rebuttal to Detective Imig's testimony (T. 785, 854). 
Defense counsel pointed out that the detective denied making 
statements to her, and that she needed to testify as to those 
statements (T. 785). The trial court denied both motions (T. 787). 
In State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650 (Utah 1985), defense 
counsel moved to withdraw prior to trial when it appeared that she 
would be required to testify as to the prior statements a 
co-defendant had made to her. After the jury was sworn, defense 
counsel moved for a mistrial in order to withdraw from the case. 
The trial court in Leonard required defense counsel to continue her 
representation of Mr. Leonard until she was forced to testify. 
This Court reversed Mr. Leonard's conviction because of 
the trial court's refusal to let defense counsel withdraw. This 
Court pointed out that where "counsel makes a timely and good faith 
application to withdraw because of the need to preserve important 
evidence . . ., a motion to withdraw should be granted." Leonard at 
654. The Court focused on the negative impact on "the credibility 
of a lawyer who appears as a witness as well as the effectiveness of 
that individual as lawyer where she appears as both lawyer and 
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witness in a given case and pointed out that under ff[t]he great 
weight of authority . . . it is error for counsel to continue 
representation where he or she is or ought to be a witness with 
respect to issues that are not incidental or signficant11 Leonard at 
653. 
As this Court pointed out in Leonard, Disciplinary Rule 
5-102(A) of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah 
State Bar required a lawyer to withdraw as counsel except under 
specific numerated circumstances when it became apparent that the 
lawyer might be required to testify on behalf of a client. Leonard, 
707 P.2d at 653. Defense counsel acted appropriately in the instant 
case in moving to withdraw. 
In the present case, the testimony defense counsel would 
have given is important to the case, and not merely incidental or 
insignificant. The implication of Imig's testimony was that Mr. 
Johnson was not involved in gun transactions with Imig and, at the 
time of the incident involved in this case, was not gathering guns 
for the detective. Testimony from defense counsel would have shown 
that they had been involved in gun transactions, that Imig was 
interested or at least the impression given Danny was that Imig was 
interested in weapons Mr. Johnson procured and that the arrangement 
between the pair was somewhat casual. Defense counsel's testimony, 
including the additional statement that Imig had told her that the 
White Horse Lounge was the only incident between the pair, would 
have suggested that Imig's recollection of details was faulty. 
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The trial court's denial of defense counsel's motions to 
withdraw for a mistrial denied Mr. Johnson due process of law under 
the fourteenth amendment and compulsory process pursuant to the 
sixth amendment of the federal constitution. In Washington v. 
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 9120, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967), the 
United States Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment due 
process clause and the sixth amendment compulsory process clause 
were violated where state law precluded a defendant from using a 
co-defendant as a witness on his behalf. The Washington Court 
acknowledged that a defendant's right to compulsory process included 
the right not only to subpoena witnesses, but also to place on the 
witness stand persons in the courtroom. See also Webb v. Texas, 409 
U.S. 95, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972). 
In the instant case, defense counsel's testimony was 
relevant and material; it would have supported Mr. Johnson's 
testimony that, contrary to the testimony of Imig, the relationship 
between the pair was casual and ongoing and that under such 
circumstances, Mr. Johnson reasonably expected that Imig would be 
interested in the guns. Under such circumstances, the trial court 
erred in denying the motion for mistrial. 
POINT X. 
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS WARRANTS 
REVERSAL OF MR. JOHNSON'S CONVICTIONS 
FOR ATTEMPTED MURDER. 
In the instant case, the errors at trial which served to 
buttress the testimony of Trooper Bringhurst and undermine the 
testimony of Mr. Johnson had the cumulative effect of denying 
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Mr. Johnson a fair trial. The doctrine of "cumulative error" allows 
for reversal where errors at trial, standing alone, do not require 
reversal but the cumulative effect of such errors prejudices the 
defendant and denies him a fair trial. See Gooden v. State, 617 
P.2d 240, 250 (Okl. Crim. App. 1980). This Court has acknowledged 
that "cumulative error" refers to a number of errors which prejudice 
[a] defendant's right to a fair trial." See State v. Ellis, 73 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 12, 13-14 (December 12, 1987) quoting State v. Rammell, 
721 P.2d 498, 501-2 (Utah 1986). 
As previously outlined, the crux of the instant case 
involved the testimonies of Trooper Bringhurst and Danny Lee 
Johnson, the only individuals who directly witnessed the entire 
incident. Mr. Johnson's defense was based on his testimony that the 
trooper fired the first shot, and Danny shot in response to that 
initial shooting. Trooper Bringhurst could not remember numerous 
details, but testified that he heard a Boom followed by five Pops. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the way in which 
the jury perceived each witness was critical to its ultimate 
determination. Errors at trial had the cumulative effect of 
inappropriately bolstering Trooper Bringhurst and undermining Mr. 
Johnson, thereby denying Mr. Johnson a fair trial. 
As outlined in Point VII, the trial court committed a 
substantial error in allowing two officers to testify as to Trooper 
Bringhurst's character for truthfulness. The trial Court also erred 
in admitting the bloody clothing of Trooper Bringhurst (See Point 
III). The early deliberations of the jurors suggested that at least 
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one juror was sympathetic to the trooper and that the juror believed 
the trooper's inability to remember details was unimportant (See 
Point VIII). The combined effect of these three errors was to 
bolster the testimony of the trooper and create an atmostpher of 
sympathy for him without focusing on his inability to remember 
details. 
The combined effect of several other errors served to 
present Mr. Johnson to the jury as a bad and violent character who 
had acted in conformity with that character during the incident in 
question. As outlined in Point II, the trial court erred in 
admitting Mr. Johnson's prior misdemeanor theft convictions. The 
trial court also erred in admitting the testimony of Jean Hickham, 
which confused the issue and presented Mr. Johnson as a violent 
man. The erroneously admitted testimony of Vern Olsen that he was 
guarding Mr. Johnson to prevent an escape was additional information 
that the jury was allowed to consider which painted a picture of Mr. 
Johnson as a dangerous and violent man. Finally, defense counsel's 
inability to testify regarding her conversation with Detective Imig 
left Mr. Johnson unable to counter the implication in imig's 
testimony that Mr. Johnson had not obtained the guns for Imig. 
The cumulative effective of the errors committed by the 
trial court had the effect of bolstering the trooper by 
imappropriately emphasizing his character for truthfulness and the 
unimportance of his inability to remember details while also 
focusing on the gruesome details, thereby inflaming the jury. While 
the cumulative effect bolstered the trooper, it served to diminish 
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any positive feelings the jury had towards Mr. Johnson by 
inappropriately pointing out that he had a prior criminal record, 
had threatened violence in an unrelated incident and was otherwise a 
violent man who was not to be believed. 
Such bolstering of the trooper combined with the 
diminishing of positive feelings towards Mr. Johnson resulted in an 
unfair trial, requiring reversal. 
POINT XI. 
THE CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE CANNOT 
" BE USED AS THE TRIGGERING OFFENSE FOR THE 
HABITUAL CRIMINAL CHARGE SINCE THE STATUTE 
SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDES HOMICIDES. 
The Utah Habitual Criminal statute explicitly excludes 
first and second degree murders from being the "triggering" offense 
in an habitual criminal charge. Utah Code Ann. §76-8-1001 (1953 as 
amended) provides: 
Habitual Criminal—Determination.—Any person who 
has been twice convicted, sentenced, and committed 
for felony offenses at least one of which offenses 
having been at least a felony of the second degree 
or a crime which, if committed within this state 
would have been a capital felony, felony of the 
first degree or felony of second degree, and was 
committed to any prison may, upon conviction of at 
least a felony of the second degree committed in 
this state, other than murder in the first or second 
degree, be determined as a habitual criminal and be 
imprisoned in the state prison for from five years 
to life. 
Vermont is the only other state to statutorily exclude 
murder as a triggering offense. Vermont Statutes Ann. (1974 
Replacement Ed.) Title 13, Section 11 reads: 
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§11• Habitual Criminals. 
A person who, after having been three time 
convicted within this state of felonies or attempts 
to commit felonies, or under the law of any other 
state, government of country, of crimes which, if 
committed within this state, would be felonious, 
commits a felony other than murder within this 
state, may be sentenced upon conviction of such 
fourth or subsequent offense to imprisonment for the 
term of his nature life.—Amended 1971, No. 199 
(Adj. Sess.), T. 15, eff. July 1, 1972. 
Neither Vermont nor Utah has addressed the issue raised 
in this case that an attempted first degree murder is explicitly 
excluded as the triggering offense. In other words, an "attempt" is 
not separate or different from the substantive offense to which it 
is attached and therefore an attempted murder offense as well as a 
murder which is actually accomplished is excluded as a triggering 
offense by the language of the habitual criminal statute. 
Mr. Johnson was convicted of attempted first degree 
murder, a first degree felony, on February 5, 1987 (T. 893). Also 
"Attempt" is a classification which is attached to an underlying 
offense. In the instant case, the underlying offense to which the 
attempt classification was attached was a first degree murder. The 
Utah Habitual Criminal statute specifically refers to offenses and 
explicitly precludes first or second degree murder as triggering 
offenses. The "offense" for which Mr. Johnson was convicted was 
first degree murder which was classified by the attempt 
designation. Because the offense itself involved a first degree 
murder, the attempted murder conviction does not qualify as a 
triggering offense for the Habitual Criminal charge. 
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To allow Mr. Johnson's conviction to be enhanced as the 
result of an attempted homicide conviction but not if an actual 
homicide is committed is logically unsound. Had the trooper died in 
the present case, and Mr. Johnson as a result was convicted of 
murder, the habitual criminal enhancement would have been 
inapplicable. Because the trooper survived, the state argued that 
the habitual criminal enhancement is available. Consequently, a 
defendant who commits an attempted homicide can be subjected to 
greater penalties than one who actually completes a homicide. 
The eighth amendment cruel and unusual punishment clause 
prohibits disproportionate punishments. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 
277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637, 645 (1983). Giving Mr. Johnson 
a more aggravated sentence for merely attempting rather than 
completing the homicide is disproportionate and constitutionally 
unsound. 
Because "attempted" first degree murder cannot be the 
triggering offense in an habitual criminal charge, the state failed 
to prove the elements of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
the conviction should be reversed. 
POINT XII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING DOCUMENTATION 
OF MR. JOHNSON'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS WHERE THE STATE 
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE PLEAS WERE KNOWING 
AND VOLUNTARY. 
The State of Utah offered as its Exhibit No. 2 on the 
Habitual Criminal charge a document under seal from the State of 
Idaho purporting to establish convictions for burglary, escape and 
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escape and assault with a deadly weapon, all committed in the State 
of Idaho (R. 633). The documents established on their face that Mr. 
Johnson appeared with counsel, and entered a plea of guilty to each 
of the charges, but did not establish that Mr. Johnson knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily entered such pleas, waiving his right 
to trial by jury, his right against self incrimination, and his 
right to confrontation of his accusers and other attendant rights 
(See Addendum B) . 
Defense counsel relied on State v. Chervenell, 626 P.2d 
530 (Wash. App. 1981) in arguing to the trial court that the state 
was required to establish that a defendant knowingly and voluntarily 
entered a guilty plea in order to use such plea as evidence in an 
habitual criminal case (R. 644). The Chervenell court stated: 
Once a defendant raises the issue, the State has the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant, in a prior conviction relied on by the 
state to prove his habitual criminal status, was 
apprised of the nature of the offense and the 
consequences of pleading guilty to it [citations 
omitted]. 
In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 
L.Ed.2d 274 (1979), the United States Supreme Court reversed a 
conviction where the trial court accepted a guilty plea without 
first establishing that the defendant was knowingly and voluntarily 
entering that plea. The Boykin Court stated ,f [admissibility of a 
confession must be based on a reliable determination of the 
voluntariness issue which satisfies the constitutional rights of the 
defendant." Id. at 242. The Boykin Court went on to point out that 
a waiver of several constitutional rights, including the privilege 
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against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury and the right 
to confront witnesses, are involved in entering a plea of guilty, 
and that a waiver of such rights cannot be presumed from a silent 
record, id. at 243. 
The Boykin Court reasoned that a guilty plea is more than 
an admission of conduct, that it is itself a conviction (Id. at 242) 
and that reversible error under the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution occurs where 
the record does not disclose that a defendant voluntarily and 
understanding]^ entered the guilty plea. 
In Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 
L.Ed.2d 319 (1967), the United States Supreme Court reversed a 
conviction where evidence of a prior conviction which showed that 
the defendant had not been represented by counsel but did not show 
on the record that the defendant had waived counsel, reached the 
jury. Id. at 112-13. The Burgett Court acknowledged that voluntary 
waiver of counsel cannot be presumed from a silent record and 
reasoned that a constitutionally infirm conviction prejudicially 
affected the outcome of the case. 
In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 
1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969), the defendant appeared with counsel and 
entered a plea of guilty. The United States Supreme Court reversed 
the conviction based on that guilty plea pursuant to Rule 11 of the 
Rules of Criminal Procedure because the judge failed to personally 
inquire of the defendant whether he understood the charges and 
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consequences of the plea. Although McCarthy was based on the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the language suggests that a 
defendant must be informed of the nature of the charges and 
consequences of the plea for the plea to be valid. The McCarthy 
Court pointed out that if a defendant's guilty plea is not equally 
voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due 
process and is therefore void. Id. 
The Court added: 
Moreover, because a guilty plea is an admission of all 
the elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be 
truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an 
understanding of the law in relation to the facts. 
Id. 
In State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985), the 
defendant challenged the admission of evidence of a prior conviction 
in a habitual criminal proceeding on the grounds that he was not 
shown to have voluntarily entered his guilty plea in the prior 
proceedings. In that case, this Court rejected the defendant's 
argument because an affidavit signed by the defendant showed that 
the defendant had been advised of the consequences of entering the 
plea and the possible penalty for the conviction, the waiver of his 
right to trial by jury, his right to confront the witnesses against 
him, his privilege against self incrimination and his right to 
appeal the conviction. Id. at 743. The defendant also stated in 
the affidavit that he had seen a copy of the information and 
understood the charge. This Court held that under such 
circumstances, a presumption that the defendant knowingly and 
voluntarily entered his plea was raised and, since the defendant 
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offered no evidence to rebut that presumption, the plea was entered 
voluntarily and its admission into evidence on the habitual criminal 
charge proper. 
In the present case, no such affidavit was entered into 
evidence by the state. Mr. Johnson challenged the validity of the 
prior pleas and the state failed to produce any evidence to sustain 
its burden of proving that the pleas were voluntarily and knowingly 
made. 
In State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), this 
Court reviewed "the law concerning the taking of guilty pleas in all 
trial courts in this state" and remanded the case to the trial court 
to enable the defendant to file a motion to withdraw his guilty 
pleas. This Court acknowledged that the due process clause of the 
federal constitution and Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure require that the trial judge take certain steps in 
establishing that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily made and 
cited the concurring opinion of Justice White in Henderson v. 
Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976) stating: 
[I]t is too late in the day to permit a guilty plea 
to be entered against a defendant solely on the 
consent of the defendant's agent—his lawyer. Our 
cases make absolutely clear that the choice to plead 
guilty must be the defendant's: it is he who must 
be informed of the consequences of his plea and what 
is that he waives when he pleads, Boykin v. Alabama, 
395 U.S. 238 (1969); and it is on his admission that 
he is in fact guilty that his conviction will rest, 
(citations omitted). 
Gibbons 740 P.2d at 1313. 
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Hence, the presence of counsel does not insure that a guilty plea is 
taken in compliance with the due process clause of the federal 
constitution. 
In the event this Court finds no federal due process 
violation in the use of such convictions, Mr. Johnson's state due 
process rights, as guaranteed by Article I, §7 of the Utah 
Constitution were nevertheless violated by the use of such 
convictions. While there is no Utah case on point, State v. 
Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986) indicates this Court's willingness 
to apply state due process guarantees in situations where the law in 
regard to the federal due process guarantee is not clear. Requiring 
that a prosecutor use prior convictions based on guilty pleas in an 
habitual criminal proceeding only after establishing beyond a 
reasonable doubt that such convictions were knowingly and 
voluntarily entered is firmly within due process guidelines. See 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313. 
The judgments admitted in this case as state's exhibit 1 
were not valid under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, §7 of the 
Utah Constitution. The state failed to show that Mr. Johnson had an 
understanding or knowledge of the effect of entering a guilty plea 
or that he knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights set forth in 
Boykin v. Alabama. The habitual criminal charge based upon the 
constitutionally infirm pleas should be reversed. 
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POINT XIII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON MR. JOHNSONfS 
CONVICTIONS FOR VEHICLE BURGLARY AND AGGRAVATED 
ASSAULT TO PROVE THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL CHARGE 
The Utah Habitual Criminal Statute, Utah Code Annotated 
76-8-1002, provides: 
Habitual Criminal—Determination.—Any person who 
has been twice convicted, sentenced, and committed 
for felony offenses at least one of which offenses 
having been at least a felony of the second degree 
or a crime which, if committed within this state 
would have been a capital felony, felony of the 
first degree or felony of second degree, and was 
committed to any prison may, upon conviction of at 
least a felony of the second degree committed in 
this state, other than murder in the first or second 
degree, be determined as a habitual criminal and be 
imprisoned in the state prison for from five years 
to life. 
The statute on its face requires that in order to be 
convicted of Being an Habitual Criminal based on convictions from 
foreign jurisdictions, one of those convictions would have to have 
been at least a second degree felony if committed in the State of 
Utah. 
In State v. Wait, 509 P.2d 372 (Wash Ct. App. 1973), the 
Washington Court of Appeals held that ffa previous conviction under a 
federal statute [may] be used for purposes of a state habitual 
criminal act as long as elements sufficient to amount to a state 
felony were included within the federal offense and thereby 
necessarily were proven beyond a reasonable doubt." [citations 
omitted]. Id. at 375. 
In State v. Rinier, 609 P.2d 1358 (Wash. 1980) the 
Washington Supreme Court stated "the test for determining the 
sufficiency of an out-of-state conviction is whether the indictment 
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or information under which defendant was convicted in a foreign 
jurisdiction stated facts sufficient to amount to the minimum 
elements of a felony in Washington." Id. at 1360. 
In People v. Taylor, 317 P.2d 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957), 
reh'g denied, Nov. 27, 1957, hearing denied Dec. 30, 1957, the Court 
overruled a conviction under the California habitual criminal 
statute where the state did not offer any proof that two foreign 
convictions it relied on met the minimum requirements of the crimes 
listed in the California statute. In that case, the defendant had 
been convicted of a burglary in Oklahoma. The Oklahoma statute 
defined burglary as breaking and entering a dwelling house of 
another with intent to commit any crime (Okla. Stat. Tit. 21, §1431 
(1983)) whereas the California statute defined burglary as an entry 
into a structure "with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or 
any felony." Pen. Code §459. Id. at 169. The Taylor Court stated: 
It may well be that defendant was prosecuted under 
the statutes which permit a conviction of burglary 
for breaking and entering with intent to commit some 
misdemeanor other than petit theft, and we must 
presume on appeal that he was convicted of the least 
offense [citations omitted]. 
Id. at 169. 
Under such circumstances, the state failed to prove that 
the offense for which the defendant was convicted in Oklahoma were 
equivalent to those enumerated in the California statute. Id. at 
169. 
In the present case, the State offered three judgments of 
conviction to support the Habitual Criminal charge. The first 
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judgment showed a conviction for burglary, the second showed a 
conviction for escape and the third, a conviction for escape and 
assault with a deadly weapon. 
Mr. Johnson's conviction for burglary under the Idaho 
Statute would not qualify as a felony in the State of Utah. The 
Idaho statute does not distinguish between burglary of a building 
and vehicle burglary and makes a distinction as to the degree of the 
burglary based only on whether it was committed during the daytime 
or at night. The Idaho Code provides: 
Idaho Code 18-1401. Burglary defined.—Every person 
who enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, 
shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, 
outhouse, or other building, tent, vessel, closed 
vehicle, closed trailer, airplane or railroad car, 
with intent to commit any theft or any felony, is 
guilty of burglary. 
18-1402. Degrees of burglary.—Every burglary 
committed in the night time is burglary of the first 
degree, and every burglary committed in the day time 
is burglary in the second degree. 
18-1403. Punishment for burglary.—Burglary of the 
first degree is punishable by imprisonment in the 
state prison for not less than one (1) nor more than 
fifteen (15) years. Burglary of the second degree 
is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison 
for not more than five (5) years. 
Utah, on the other, makes a distinction between a 
burglary of a building and a burglary of a vehicle. See Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-202 (1953 as amended and Utah Code Ann, §76-6-204 (1953 
as amended). Utah Code Ann. §76-6-204 (1953 as amended) provides in 
pertinent part: 
76-6-204. Burglary of a vehicle—Charge of other 
offense.— 
(1) Any person who unlawfully enters any vehicle 
with intent to commit a felony or theft is guilty of 
a burglary of a vehicle. 
(2) Burglary of a vehicle is a Class A Misdemeanor. 
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Hence the vehicle burglary would have been a Class A 
Misdemeanor under the Utah statutes, and therefore not applicable to 
an habitual criminal charge. See State v. Tribble, 613 P.2d 173 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1980) and People v. Taylor, 317 P.2d. 167. 
The Idaho conviction for Assault with a deadly weapon 
would not qualify as at least a second degree felony in the State of 
Utah. The Idaho Code provides: 
18-905. Aggravated assault defined.—An aggravated 
assault is an assault: 
(a) With a deadly weapon or instrument without 
intent to kill; or 
(b) By any means or force likely to produce great 
bodily harm. [; or] 
(c) With any vitrio, corrosive acid, or a caustic 
chemical of any kind. 
(d) "Deadly weapon or instrument" as used in this 
chapter is defined to include any firearm, though 
unloaded or so defective that it cannot be fired. 
18-906. Aggravated assault—Punishment.—An 
aggravated assault is punishable by imprisonment in 
the state prison not to exceed five (5) years or by 
fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000) or 
by both. 
The Utah Code makes such an assault a third degree felony. 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 76-5-103 provides: 
Aggravated assault.—A person commits aggravated 
assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 
76-5-102 and: 
(a) He intentionally causes serious bodily injury 
to another; or 
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such means or force 
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) Aggravated assault is a felony of the third 
degree. 
In addition, the punishment Mr. Johnson received on the 
assault charge, zero to two years, is significantly less than the 
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punishment for a second degree felony in the State of Utah. Hence 
the conviction for assault with a deadly weapon was not a felony of 
at least the second degree. 
The remaining two charges of escape arose under 
circumstances where, although Mr. Johnson was being held at the 
Idaho prison or adjacent farm facility, he was being held on the 
vehicle burglary charge which would have been a misdemeanor in 
Utah. Had the crime of vehicle burglary been committed in Utah, Mr. 
Johnson would have been in custody at the jail, and any escape would 
have been a Class B Misdeameanor. See Utah Code Ann. §76-8-309 
(1953 as amended). 
The escapes can be considered second degree felonies only 
if the Court focuses on the place of incarceration and not the 
underlying crime which put Mr. Johnson there. Focusing on the place 
of incarceration ignores the fact that Mr. Johnson was being held on 
vehicle burglary charge, a relatively minor crime under Utah's 
Criminal Code. Allowing the escapes, which would have amounted to a 
felony under Utah's criminal structure only if the place of 
incarceration is the focus, to be used as second degree felonies to 
support the habitual criminal charge does not further the purpose of 
the Habitual Criminal statute, which is to make persistent serious 
offenders subject to greater sanctions. See State v. Montague, 671 
P.2d 187, 190 (Utah 1983); State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Utah 
1985). Denoting the escapes as second degree felonies does not 
negate the fact that Mr. Johnson had a prior conviction for only one 
"street" crime which would have been a misdemeanor if committed in 
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Utah. Mr. Johnson's prior record does not show the type of 
persistent offender the legislature intended to be punished by the 
habitual criminal statute and upholding the habitual criminal 
conviction based on Mr. Johnson's prior record does not further the 
purposes of the statute. 
Because the trial court erred in relying on the prior 
convictions involved in this case, the conviction for Habitual 
Criminal should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant, Danny 
Lee Johnson, respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
convictions and remand the case to the district court for either 
dismissal of the charges or a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this If day of JJay, 1988. 
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Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
1 bias or a feeling or an interest in the case that is so 
2 overwhelming that it's up to the Court to make the 
3 determination that because of that association that we 
4 ought to lead, and I am asking the Court to do that. 
5 THE COURT: Well, instead of going on any furthejf-
6 why don't we have him take the stand. You can ask him 
7 some questions. We can determine whether he's going to 
8 be biased, and if he is, we can declare him to be a hostile 
9 witness. If he's going to be neutral, then he can be — 
10 MS. PALACIOS: Okay. I will put him on the 
11 stand. 
12 T H E BAILIFF: Do you want him right now? 
13 THE COURT: Right now. 
14 
15 DAN L. FALLOWS, 
1€ called as a witness by the defendant, having been duly 
17 sworn, was examined and testified upon his oath as follows: 
18 
19 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
20 BY MS. PALACIOS: 
21 ft Lt. Fallows, before the jury enters the room, 
22 I am going to ask you some preliminary questions. Would 
23 you please first state your name. 
24 A- Dan L. Fallows. 
25 ft And Lt. Fallows, who are you employed by? 
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1 A. The Utah Department of Public Safety Division 
2 of the Utah Highway Patrol. 
3 ft Is that the same agency that employees 
4 Trooper Bringhurst? 
5 k That's correct. 
6 ft And how do you know Trooper Bringhurst? 
7 A. I have known him through working acquaintance 
8 and developed friendship through the 13, 14 years he has 
9 been on. 
to ft Would you say that he's a personal friend? 
11 k Yes. 
12 ft Is it true or not true that you were upset 
13 at having to testify on behalf of the defense? 
14 A. That's correct. 
15 ft Is it true that you did not want any appearance 
16 of associating with the defense? 
17 A. I wouldn't say that that is a correct statement. 
18 I honor the subpoena. 
19 ft I understand that. But your feelings were 
20 that you did not want to be, if I may use your word, 
21 connotated with the defense; is that correct? 
22 A. A true reluctance, yes. 
23 ft And is it or is it not true that you were 
24 concerned regarding your appearance as to other law 
25 enforcement people that you would be aiding the defense 
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1 if you testified on behalf of the defendant? 
2 A. That was a natural concern on my part. 
3 ft But it's a concern nonetheless; is that correct? 
4 k Correct. 
5 ft And do you have strong feelings about this 
6 case and the outcome of this case? 
7 A. I couldn't answer no to that* It's a situation 
8 where obviously I have feelings but I also have a duty 
9 which I will perform. 
10 ft I realize that, but my question is do you have 
11 strong feelings about the outcome of this case? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 ft And you would like to see the defendant convicted) 
14 is that correct? 
15 A. I would like to see justice served. 
\C ft But you would also like to see the defendant 
17 convicted? 
18 A. I don't think that's a fair statement. I would 
19 like to see justice served in this case. 
20 ft And in your opinion is justice that the defendant) 
21 be convicted? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 ft And is it not true that you would not talk 
24 to us, meaning the defendant's attorneys, without or at 
25 least you expressed that you did not want to talk to us 
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without the county attorneys or even commissioner, I believe 
is who you said, being present at the same time? 
k That's not entirely correct. I have talked 
to you and your secretary. 
$ But I mean regarding the facts — 
k I simply expressed a desire that before I answer 
your questions that I then seek counsel through the County 
Attorney's Office and the advice was given by me when I 
expressed my concerns to the commissioner of public safety, 
who is an attorney, that he felt like that would be all 
right. I simply didn't want to violate any ethics or anythirjg 
Q, And in fact in response to our subpoena you 
went to the commissioner and asked him what to do; is that 
right? 
A. No. No. I only did that after I got a phone 
call from you and from your secretary questioning an 
appointment to meet and go over specific questions. That 
was — I then notified the commissioner of public safety 
through his secretary and expressed my concerns. 
Q. And at that point then you talked to us only 
when the county attorney was present with respect to the 
facts of this case? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And the county attorney talked to you before 
we were ever present; is that correct, on the same day? 
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what causes the reluctance within myself that I have no 
choice but to tell the truth. 
Q. And you're fully prepared to do that? 
A. Yes, I am. 
MS. KNIGHT-EGAN: Your Honor, I think we should 
see how it goes and direct counsel to start out with 
nonleading questions and if it becomes clear to the Court 
that that, you know, the witness isn't responding fairly 
to that form of questioning and that a more restrictive 
form of questioning ought to be allowed, then at that time 
the Court can direct that to happen. 
MS. PALACIOS: Your Honor, I would submit that 
it can't be any clearer than a witness who is a personal 
friend of the person who was severely injured here who 
has an interest in the outcome. I don't think it requires 
that he not testify honestly. I am not submitting at all 
that he would not attempt to do that. However, I think 
the Court knows that when there's that type of interest, 
there's a reason for those rules and we're asking the Court 
to allow us to proceed by those rules. 
THE COURT: Based on his response, he has 
indicated that he, if under oath, he will answer truthfully 
regardless of what the outcome will be. That unless it's 
shown he's a hostile witness in his answers, that we're 
going to have to deny your motion to declare him a hostile 
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1 MS. KNIGHT-EGAN: It says interrogation may 
2 be by leading questions. Not that it has to be. The Court 
3 could find this witness is associated with a party and 
4 still not find that the form of leading questions is 
5 necessarily appropriate. It's not automatic. It's like 
6 when we call a child witness, we're frequently allowed 
7 to use leading questions but not until we run into trouble 
8 on direct examination with the nonleading form. Then 
9 the Court will permit us to adopt the other form. 
10 THE COURT: Yes. Pursuant to the language 
11 that says "may," and pursuant to his answer that if he's 
12 under oath that he will testify truthfullyregardless of 
13 the outcome, I think the Court is of the opinion that until 
14 we find out that he's hostile that even under 611(c) where 
15 it says he may be associated with the opposing party, that 
16 under the circumstances of this case here, that that motion 
17 should be denied. 
18 MS. PALACIOS: Thank you, your Honor. 
19 THE BAILIFF: Should I bring the jury in, your 
20 Honor? 
21 THE COURT: Just a minute. Let's see if there's 
22 anything else. 
23 MS. PALACIOS: I think we're prepared to proceed 
24 with him. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
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airaiAs. DA.VW LEE JCSIJSON ^..- ,• .«. *,t, 
iv* ,r„. *i 'ESCAPE A>D ASSAULT VTITH A DEADLY WEAPON 
>n«4 « u i^yp- *> -. • ' 1*1-4; t f e * f.r»>* '.«,*,< # 4 t f > » » » * h { 7S * * • « J \ ^ ? * . — ; * i „ ^ ., « - » ^ * f 
Si A i r ! * . » ' » r.f - „ f , * M , r ~ f ' * . V M r * ? * * » . „ . < , * ft ft i ftd M C H C t ft* C * f u r l e d O f t { # * , H O t t O 
exceed f ive (5) y<?at\« on the E*cit>e :h*r$e and fvo (2) years en the 
Assault v ( th i Oeadlv V>*ron, s t i d «»*n?enc*3 *.•> run. c o n v e y t fvt*l yf ?o 
rum consecut ive ly with sent*tt<:c rr*»*4*nt 1 y ^**t«vS ^5>*v^d by :^*fr -jd^nt. 
DAK>W LEE JCI^ >SOM 
,». c«.M.r.,( u». H , »,d DAKN-Y LEE iOK:SOX 
oi ik* ***** *f u*^ ur r»» -, ^trr,4 fiVl* /$) ycATfl eft the E»cape chJir^^ and tvo (2> 
years on the Assault with a Deadly «eiif n^ charge*, 14!d sentences to run 
consecutively
 1( to run consecut ive lv with sentence present!* befn;? served 
by Defendant at; th i s t i ^ e . 
*#i4 OiPtrirt r^fv. m ti^ f •:: M?,«* »n v^« k»,i <-r«»i* %r M». \*>% fyth u* ' March Vi 76 
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